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North Macedonia


Basic Facts about the Country

Membership of the Council of Europe

17 December 1995

Entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights

10 April 1997

Basic Facts about the Judiciary

Budget per inhabitant

Number of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants

21.4

Constitutional Court (State level)

Yes 

  • The Constitutional Court has 9 judges, who are elected by Parliament by a majority vote. Two Judges are nominated by the President of the Republic, two by the Judicial Council and 5 by the Assembly.   
  • Judges are elected for a non-renewable term of 9 years. The President of the Court is elected by the judges from among their ranks for a non-renewable term of three years.  
  • Judges may only be dismissed for reasons defined in the Constitution by a two-thirds majority of the Court.  
  • The Constitutional Court decides on the conformity of laws with the Constitution on competency conflicts between the bodies of the Republic and the local self-government units; on the accountability of the President of the Republic; on the conformity of other regulations and of collective agreements with the Constitution and the laws; on the conformity of the programmes and statutes of the political parties and the associations of the citizens with the Constitution; and protects the freedoms and rights of individuals relating to the freedom of conviction, conscience, thought and public expression of thought, political association and activity as well as to the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, religion, national, social and political affiliation; decides on competency conflicts between the holders of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

Public Prosecutors

  • The Public Prosecutor’s Office is a single and autonomous state body. Its main task is carrying out legal measures against persons who have committed criminal and other offences.
  • The Public Prosecutor is appointed by the Assembly upon a proposal of the government for a term of six years with the right to reappointment.
  • The Public Prosecutor can be dismissed for reasons described in the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office by the Assembly. The request for dismissal is submitted by the government upon a prior opinion from the Council of Public Prosecutors.

Gender breakdown of judges

All instances

Male
Female

Judicial Governance

Type of governance system

Judicial council model - Moderate

Judicial Council

Consists of 15 members, including:

  • The President of the Supreme Court ex officio 
  • The Minister of Justice ex officio 
  • Eight members elected by the judges from their own ranks. Three of them belong to the communities that are not in the majority in North Macedonia, ensuring that equitable representation of citizens belonging to all communities is observed. 
  • Three members elected by the Assembly of North Macedonia with majority votes of the total number of MPs, and with majority votes from the total number of MPs who belong to the communities that are not in the majority in North Macedonia. 
  • Two members proposed by the President of North Macedonia, elected by the Assembly of North Macedonia; one of them belongs to the communities that are not in the majority in North Macedonia.

 

  • The members of the Council serve a term of 6 years, renewable only once.   
  • The members of the Council elected by the Assembly of North Macedonia, on a proposal of the President of North Macedonia are from among university law professors, lawyers and other prominent jurists. 

Court presidents

  • Elected by the Judicial Council from the ranks of judges who have at least six years of uninterrupted judicial service in a court of the same or higher degree 
  • Elected for a term of four years with the right to another election in a court of the same degree 

Council of Public Prosecutors

  • Consists of nine members, including the Public Prosecutor of North Macedonia, higher public prosecutors and the Basic Public Prosecutor from Skopje. Two members are appointed by the Collegiums of the Public Prosecutor’s Office from the ranks of all the public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors, and other two by the government, upon a proposal by the Minister of Justice.   
  • The five ex-officio members (Public Prosecutor of North Macedonia, select higher public prosecutors, and Basic Public Prosecutor from Skopje) serve automatically upon holding their primary positions—no separate election occurs. The Public Prosecutor is proposed by the Council itself via public call and appointed by Parliament for a renewable six-year term; other ex-officio roles follow internal hierarchical assignments under Council oversight. The two Collegium-elected members are chosen through internal voting among prosecutors/deputies meeting experience criteria, while the two government members are nominated by the Minister of Justice (typically lawyers or experts) and formally appointed by Government decree after vetting. 
  • All non-ex-officio members (four total) hold renewable four-year mandates, allowing reappointment or re-election absent conflicts or term limits. Ex-officio terms align with their main office durations. The remaining four ex-officio members (higher public prosecutors, Basic Public Prosecutor from Skopje) have terms tied to their primary offices—no fixed 4- or 6-year mandate.

Distribution of Responsibility

Judicial Council
  • elects and dismisses judges and lay judges; observing the equitable representation of all communities 
  • determines the termination of a judge’s office; 
  • elects and dismisses Presidents of Courts; observing the equitable representation of all communities 
  • monitors and assesses the work of the judges 
  • decides on the disciplinary accountability of judges; 
  • decides on revoking the immunity of judges; 
  • proposes two judges for the Constitutional Court from among the judges; and 
  • performs other duties stipulated by law. 
  • submits an annual report about its work to the Assembly of North Macedonia. 
Court presidents
  • Makes the assignment of judges by an annual work schedule 
  • Gives a written explanation upon previously obtained opinion from the general session of the Supreme Court of North Macedonia when a judge is transferred to another court division against his/ her will 
Council of Public Prosecutors

Main tasks: 

  • Realisation of the procedure for appointment and discharge 
  • Determining the responsibility of the public prosecutors and the deputy public prosecutors 
  • Providing positive opinion on the appointment of a Public Prosecutor 
  • Acting on second instance in the procedure for determining disciplinary responsibility and incompetent working and achieving unsatisfactory results while performing the duties 
  • Preparing a working protocol 
  • Establishing on the basis of documents stating the diagnosis and analysis of a competent medical commission whether the Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Public Prosecutor permanently lose the mental and physical capacity for performing the function of a Public Prosecutor 

Cooperation with other bodies: 

  • Following the decision of the Council of Public Prosecutors, the Public Prosecutor submits a proposal for dismissal of the Public Prosecutor or Deputy Public Prosecutor to the Parliament of North Macedonia. 
  • The Public Prosecutor’s Office upon prior consent by the Council of Public Prosecutors allocates the means approved with the Budget of North Macedonia by public prosecutor’s offices on the basis of measures and criteria. 
  • The Government of North Macedonia determines the number of the Deputy Public Prosecutors upon a proposal by the Minister of Justice and following a prior positive opinion of the Council of Public Prosecutors 

Challenges

Courts’ inadequate communication with the public

The levels of perceived judicial independence and trust in the judiciary among the public remain low in North Macedonia. According to the World Justice Project 2023 General Population Poll, only 24% of respondents stated they had a lot or some trust in judges and magistrates. The Poll found that public views on the pervasiveness of corruption among judges and magistrates deteriorated the most since the 2017 poll, with a staggering 73% of respondents believing that most or all magistrates were corrupt. Citizens have little trust in the independence of the judiciary from political influence as well, with 60% of respondents agreeing that top government officials seek to influence the promotion and removal of judges. In particular, 54% said that top government officials refuse to comply with court rulings that are not in their favour, and 55% that top government officials seek to limit the courts’ competencies and freedom to interpret the law.   

Government pressure on judges in specific cases

Several reports have identified shortcomings regarding the judiciary’s independence and impartiality due to political interference. According to a Corruption Risk Assessment of the Judiciary carried out by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in 2023, over one-third of judges reported experiencing some form of influence or pressure from the executive branch of power (36%) or from representatives of political parties (37%). 

Ineffectiveness and lack of independence of criminal investigations

In September 2023, the North Macedonian Parliament passed laws that amended the Criminal Code in a fast-track procedure. The amendments include changes to the crime of abuse of office and to the statute of limitations, as well as to investigative measures. The changes immediately impacted some high-profile cases, such as:

  • Land Privatization Case: this investigation targeted senior government officials and local authorities accused of illegally privatizing public land through undervalued sales and fictitious tenders between 2010-2020, allegedly causing millions in state losses. Passed to the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) in 2021, the probe relied on abuse of office charges under Article 353. The September 2023 Criminal Code amendments shortened the statute of limitations from 12 to 8 years, retroactively expiring limitations for most acts by September 2023, forcing termination despite strong evidence.
  • SPO High-Level Corruption Probes: the SPO pursued multiple cases against former ministers, MPs, and party leaders for abuse of office (Article 353) and criminal association in rigged public procurement, including overpriced COVID-19 contracts and road construction tenders (2017-2022). Amendments decriminalized “negligent” abuse, reduced penalties below corruption thresholds, and cut statutes from 10-15 to 6-8 years, nullifying over 20 probes overnight—including the “Highway Scandal” implicating ex-PM Gruevski allies—sparking EU and GRECO condemnation.

Ongoing cases had to be terminated either because of changes to the statute of limitations or because of the abolishment of the offence for which the suspects were being investigated. The fast-track procedure used to pass these amendments raised concerns about the lack of legislative scrutiny. In February 2025, the North Macedonian Constitutional Court held that the amendments violated constitutional principles and ordered Parliament to correct the respective laws. 

Politically Captured or Heavily Influenced Judicial Council (and/or Other Bodies of Judicial Governance) 

North Macedonia’s Judicial Council consists of 15 members, out of which 13 are elected by different bodies. The two unelected members are the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice, both are members ex officio. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommended that the Minister of Justice’s ex officio membership be abolished. It is concerned with an undue political influence stemming from the Minister’s membership. North Macedonia has not abolished the Minister’s membership, but it has implemented rules of procedure that state that the Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court do not receive materials for procedures in which they do not participate. Further, the Minister of Justice does not receive information about examinations of judges’ responsibilities and about elections of judges or court presidents. Starting from 2019, the Minister of Justice has not attended any sessions of the Judicial Council. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions granting the Minister of Justice significant power as a member of the Judicial Council remain. A proposal to change the relevant provisions has failed in Parliament on the grounds that the Minister of Justice de facto cannot exercise political influence on the Judicial Council as he or she does not attend meetings. But this practice could be abolished in the future, and the risk remains that the Minister of Justice intervenes and influences the Judicial Council. 

(Attempted) political influence on the Judicial Council is also highlighted by executive intentions to disband the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors. The EU Commission warned that this would undermine the judiciary’s independence and called for ensuring that judges are appointed independently and based on merit. In February 2025, the North Macedonian Prime Minister announced that his party will try to dismiss the five members of the Judicial Council who are elected by the assembly. This would be contrary to the Law on the Judicial Council which stipulates that only the Judicial Council itself can dismiss its members. 

According to a 2024 EU report most judges do not believe that the Judicial Council is capable of ensuring judicial independence. During parliamentary and presidential elections, all appointments and disciplinary proceedings are suspended, which raises further concerns about the Council’s independence. Further, there are concerns about whether appointments and promotions of judges are merit-based as appointment decisions lack sufficient reasoning. 

 

Judicial councils under strong political influence

The composition of the Judicial Council has been a cause of concern due to the presence of the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice as members ex officio. In 2023, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommended that the Minister of Justice’s ex officio membership be abolished due to concerns about undue political influence. While the recommendation was not followed, the government has adopted rules of procedure according to which the Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court do not receive materials for procedures in which they do not participate. Further, the Minister of Justice does not receive information about examinations of judges’ responsibilities and about elections of judges or court presidents. Since 2019, the Minister of Justice has not attended any sessions of the Judicial Council. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions granting the Minister of Justice significant power as a member of the Judicial Council remain. A proposal to change the relevant provisions failed in Parliament on the grounds that the Minister of Justice de facto cannot exercise political influence on the Judicial Council, as he or she does not attend meetings. However, this practice could be abolished in the future, potentially opening the door to the Minister’s undue influence over the Council. 

Attempts to exercise political influence over judicial governance bodies have also been made through proposals to disband the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors. In February 2025, the North Macedonian Prime Minister announced that his party would try to dismiss the five members of the Judicial Council who are elected by the assembly. This would be contrary to the Law on the Judicial Council, which stipulates that only the Judicial Council itself can dismiss its members. The European Commission warned that this would undermine the judiciary’s independence and called for ensuring that judges are appointed independently and based on merit. In March 2025, the Parliament voted on ‘interpellation motions’ against the five non-magistrate members of the Council, citing their unprofessional performance of duties that eroded the already low public trust in the judiciary.  While these motions do not provide legal grounds for dismissal, they actively serve as de facto political no-confidence votes. 

On top of the challenges posed by the increasing political pressure, the Council does not enjoy particularly high trust from judges either, with most judging it incapable of ensuring judicial independence per the 2024 EU report. The suspension of all appointments and disciplinary proceedings during parliamentary and presidential elections, and the lack of sufficient reasoning in appointment decisions and promotions that should be merit-based, cast further doubts on the integrity of the Council.  

Courts' lack of staff and funding

North Macedonia’s judiciary is faced with a shortage of judges. More than a third of judge positions were vacant in 2024, and in the upcoming years, the issue might be aggravated due to retirements. Filling the vacancies is particularly difficult, with recruitment processes often having to be repeated due to the lack of applications or eligible candidates. Moreover, the rigid interpretation of the Electoral Code, which prohibits employment procedures for judges from taking place during election periods, further delays recruitment processes and promotions. The severe understaffing of the judicial system is further exacerbated by the lack of training of new judges and prosecutors, as the admission process to the Academy has been on hold for two years for unclear reasons. While human resources strategies for the Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Office were adopted in 2020, the implementation remains poor.  

Slow judicial proceedings

The increasing inefficiency of the North Macedonian justice system has been highlighting in various reports over the last few years. In 2023, the clearance rate was below 100% in all case categories for both first and second instance, meaning that there were more incoming than resolved cases over the year. The clearance rate in second instance administrative cases has particularly deteriorated, dropping from 103% to 69%, while the disposition time tripled from 92 to 306 days. These negative developments have caused a significant backlog of cases that the courts are struggling to address. 

Inadequate safeguards against political influence over prosecutors

North Macedonia faces ongoing concerns over inadequate safeguards against political influence in its prosecution service. Despite reforms aimed at independence, the Council of Public Prosecutors—still operating under the pre-2026 structure with mixed appointments (government, collegiums, ex-officio)—lacks robust protections against executive pressure, as noted in EU Rule of Law Reports. Government-appointed members and Parliament’s role in appointing the Chief Prosecutor create vulnerability to political leverage, especially amid stalled 2025 draft laws for peer elections. 

A stark example unfolded in 2025 with Chief Prosecutor Ljupco Kocevski. Elected in February 2024 for a six-year term, Kocevski faced a no-confidence motion passed by Parliament on July 29, 2025 (71 votes), followed by a government dismissal proposal in December citing “unauthorized disclosures,” procedural secrecy breaches, and institutional damage—allegedly tied to high-profile case handling like the Kocani nightclub fire. Kocevski resigned on December 15, 2025, ahead of Parliament’s vote, decrying it as political retaliation undermining prosecutorial autonomy; the Council of Public Prosecutors had issued a negative opinion on the dismissal. Critics, including the opposition SDSM, labeled it politicization, echoing Venice Commission warnings on using management issues as dismissal pretexts. 

Positive Developments & Achievements

Enhanced Transparency 

Among the judiciary, measures were taken to enhance transparency. In 2022, the Council for Open Judiciary, composed of members of the Judicial Council, the Academy of Judges and Public Prosecutors, civil society organizations, and professional associations, was established. In 2024, it adopted an Action Plan for Open Judiciary aimed at improving transparency, increasing the quality and availability of information, and strengthening the Judicial Council’s supervisory function. Since then, there have been a number of improvements. Most courts now publish their rulings on their websites. Both the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors improved their transparency, especially through more publications and increased media engagement. Moreover, in 2024, the Supreme Court amended its rules of procedure concerning the attendance of the public and the media at court sessions to improve transparency and public trust in the judiciary. 

Improvements of disciplinary proceedings 

In its 2024 report, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) noted that North Macedonia has improved its procedures for disciplinary sanctions against judges. Possible infringements are now clearly defined, and judges can only be dismissed for the most serious infringements. Changes to the Law of the Judicial Council have also erased doubts about a lack of proportionality in disciplinary proceedings: dismissals of judges are only allowed in the most serious cases, as there are several other sanctions available to respond to judges’ disciplinary violations or misconduct. Therefore, GRECO is now satisfied that its recommendations were implemented. 

Rankings and Surveys

Expert Recommendations

Recommendations from the EU Commission - North Macedonia Report - 2025 Enlargement Package

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only implemented to a limited extent and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular:

  • adopt a new Law on civil procedure, in line with European standards, and accelerate implementation of the Strategy for Judicial Reform;
  • strengthen the Judicial Council by adopting a revised legislative framework and continue increasing its transparency and independence, in line with the recommendations of the 2023 peer review mission and the opinion of the Venice Commission, and step up implementation of the human resources strategies for the judiciary and the public prosecution service;
  • ensure that the Automated Court Case Management Information System (ACCMIS) is fully functional and compatible with the level of complexity of court cases and the method for assessing judges and presidents of courts.
Recommendations from the EU Commission - North Macedonia Report - 2024 Enlargement Package

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and are therefore largely valid. In the coming year, North Macedonia should in particular: 

  • adopt a new Law on civil procedure, in line with European standards and start implementing the new strategy on judicial reform;
  • strengthen the Judicial Council by revising the legislative framework and its overall functioning to enhance its transparency and independence, in line with the recommendations of the 2023 peer review mission, and step up the implementation of the human resources strategies for the judiciary and the prosecution;
  • ensure that the automated court case management information system (ACCMIS) is fully functional and compatible with level of complexity of court cases and the method or assessing judges and presidents of courts 
Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the draft laws on the Public Prosecutor’s Office and on the Council of Public Prosecutors, 2025
Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 144th Plenary Session (Venice, 9-10 October 2025)

63. In respect of the draft law on the Council of Public Prosecutors, the Venice Commission makes the following key recommendations:

  1. to reconsider the duration of professional experience for all lay members of the Council of Public Prosecutors, with a view to uniformising them;
  2. to provide an alternative to the way the four lay members are to be elected pursuant to the draft law, whereby it is to be ensured that the election is based on the merits and integrity of the candidates and favours a diverse representation;
  3. to provide that the prosecutorial functions of prosecutors elected to the Council of Public Prosecutors by their peers are suspended for the duration of their term on the Council;
  4. to clarify in the commentaries to the draft law (if not the law itself) the concepts “impacts the autonomy of public prosecutors” or “neglects or fails to perform their function and duties in the work of the Council” as grounds for dismissal of members of the Council of Public Prosecutors;
  5. to include additional safeguards to prevent that critical decisions, including decisions on the pre-term loss of mandate of Council members, are inevitably determined by the prosecutorial majority in the Council;
  6. to explicitly provide in the draft law that both the prosecutorial and lay members of the Council sit on this body in their individual capacity and that the prosecutorial members of the Council are not subordinated to the Public Prosecutor of the Republic in as far their work in the Council is concerned, and to stipulate that the Public Prosecutor has no voting rights on the Council in certain areas, such as discipline;
  7. to provide as a transitional measure that current Council members continue to serve until completion of their existing terms.

64. In turn, in respect of the draft law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Venice Commission makes the following key recommendations:

  1. to incorporate managerial and organisational skills in the eligibility criteria for the position of Public Prosecutor;
  2. to clarify in the law that the mandate of the Public Prosecutor can only be renewed once, pending a necessary amendment to the Constitution to prevent reappointment of the Public Prosecutor, and to introduce a cooling-off period precluding immediate re-election;
  3. to stipulate that any criminal conviction entailing imprisonment terminates the term of office of the Public Prosecutor and prosecutors;
  4. to amend the grounds for dismissal of the Public Prosecutor to provide for greater clarity and foreseeability;
  5. to require the government to provide a clear reasoning to the Assembly when it deviates from the opinion of the Council of Public Prosecutors on the dismissal of the Public Prosecutor;
  6. to provide adequate procedural safeguards for prosecutors under evaluation;
  7. to remove two consecutive negative performance evaluations from the list of “most severe disciplinary violations” which could lead to dismissal;
  8. to clarify that the accountability of the Public Prosecutor to the Assembly does not extend to individual prosecutorial decisions and prosecutions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

65. In addition, the Venice Commission recommends:

  1. to allow for lay members of the Council of Public Prosecutor to become President of the Council of Public Prosecutors;
  2. to broaden one of the conflict-of-interest categories (requiring the recusal of members of the Council of Public Prosecutors) beyond situations in which the prosecutor has participated or is participating in other proceedings against that public prosecutor or candidate for public prosecutor;
  3. to delete the phrase “unless otherwise determined” from the provision on the equality of rights and obligations of members of the Council of Public Prosecutors in the draft law on the Council of Public Prosecutors or to provide a closed list of exceptions to the equality of rights and obligations of members of the Council;
  4. to clarify some of the disciplinary grounds in Articles 93 and 94 of the draft law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as well as the concept of “severe consequences” used in Article 90 of that same draft law.
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Fourth Evaluation Round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report, 2020
Adopted by GRECO at its 95th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 27 November – 1 December 2023)

32. GRECO recommended that, in order to strengthen the independence of the judiciary from undue political influence, the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the Judicial Council be abolished. [not implemented]

55. GRECO recommended that the disciplinary regime applicable to prosecutors be reviewed so that (i) infringements are clearly defined and that (ii) the range of available sanctions be extended to ensure better proportionality ensuring, in particular, that dismissal of a prosecutor is only possible for the most serious cases of misconduct. [partly implemented]

Compliance with European Courts' Judgements

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

State Performance

Moderate

Implementation record

18

Number of leading judgments pending implementation Moderately Low

35 %

Percentage of leading judgements from the last 10 years still pending implementation Significant

39

Average time leading judgments have been pending implementation Moderate
European Implementation Network
Judgements with pending implementation

Selected on relevance to the judiciary / rule of law

Kitanovski v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Non-implementation

The case concerns ill-treatment by police, ineffective investigations into the allegations of ill-treatment, and a violation of the right to life due to the unjustified use of potentially lethal force. The facts of the case are disputed. It is agreed that the applicant has been chased by the police after he avoided a routine traffic control. During the chase, police officers fired shots at the applicant’s car. According to the government, a police officer was injured during the chase because he had to jump aside to avoid getting hit by the applicant’s car. After the applicant was stopped, he was removed from his car and handcuffed on the ground. The government alleges that one police officer twisted his arm, pulled him out of his car, and made him lie on the street, where he was handcuffed. According to the applicant, several police officers dragged him out of his car and physically assaulted him, including punches and kicks, and the use of truncheons. The beating continued when he was handcuffed. 

The applicant’s father lodged a criminal complaint on the applicant’s behalf against unidentified police officers, alleging torture, endangerment, and ill-treatment. However, the prosecutor found no grounds for the officers’ prosecution. The Ministry of Interior lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant on the grounds of assault against a police officer on duty. After the indictment by the public prosecutor, the case was heard by the Skopje Court of First Instance, its judgment was appealed, and the criminal proceedings were pending at the time of the ECtHR judgment.  

Before the ECtHR, the applicant argued that the alleged ill-treatment by the police violated Art. 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture), and that the investigation into his allegations was ineffective and did not lead to an effective remedy, contrary to Art. 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy). The Court considered the complaints also under Art. 2 ECHR (right to life). In its judgment, the ECtHR held that the use of potentially lethal force (firing shots at the car) was not absolutely necessary and thus violated Art. 2 ECHR. Regarding the alleged ill-treatment, the Court was not convinced by the government’s arguments that there had been no police brutality. Consequently, it found a violation of Art. 3 ECHR. The Court was also not convinced that there had been an effective investigation into the applicant’s claims and held that Art. 2, 3 ECHR were violated in their procedural parts. Having already found a violation of these procedural parts, the Art. 13 ECHR claim was dismissed. The applicant was awarded damages. 

North Macedonia abolished the statute of limitations for torture and introduced a zero-tolerance approach regarding police ill-treatment. The previous law on the use of force and firearms was replaced with a new statute that includes strict requirements for their use. Police units were provided circulars emphasizing the importance of the applicable laws, and awareness-raising activities and targeted training were conducted. Moreover, procedural measures have been introduced to ensure effective investigations. Information on some remaining issues, such as the interpretation of relevant laws, and statistics on the use of firearms by police, has been requested by the Committee of Ministers. 

A decade later, implementation remains critically incomplete despite formal measures. North Macedonia abolished statutes of limitations for torture, adopted a stricter Law on Use of Force and Firearms (replacing the prior framework), issued police circulars, conducted trainings, and introduced investigation protocols, yet the Committee of Ministers continues supervising, requesting clarifications on law interpretation, firearm use statistics, and effective remedy gaps as of 2026. This prolonged non-compliance underscores ongoing deficiencies in independent probes and accountability, with no full execution reported, risking further violations 

View case details

15191/12

22-04-2015