Skip to content


Basic Facts about the Country

Membership of the European Union

1 January 1958

Membership of the Council of Europe

13 July 1950

Entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights

3 September 1953

Basic Facts about the Judiciary

Budget per inhabitant

Number of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants


Tiers in the ordinary court system (Federal and State [Länder] courts)


Federal Courts (Federal Court of Justice, Federal Administrative Court, Federal Finance Court, Federal Labour Court, Federal Social Court)


Local Courts


Regional Courts


Higher Regional Courts


Administrative Courts


Higher Administrative Courts


Financial Courts


Labour Courts


Higher Labour Courts


Social Courts


Higher Social Courts


Constitutional Court

Yes (a Federal Constitutional Court, and constitutional courts in each of the states).

  • The Federal Constitutional Court has 16 justices – eight in each of the two senates. These are appointed by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (half each). For the procedure in the Bundestag, the German federal parliament, the so-called Election Committee (Wahlausschuss) has the right to propose candidates. The Election Committee is appointed at the beginning of each election period, and consists of 12 members of the Bundestag, who are elected on proposal of the parliamentary groups, according to the rules of proportional representation. If at least eight votes of the members of the Election Committee fall on one candidate, they are proposed to the plenum of the Bundestagfor election. In the election procedure of the Bundesrat, the legislative body representing the 16 states, the Justices are elected after a resolution proposed by a special commission (Findungskommission).
  • In both, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, a two-thirds majority of votes is required to confirm the proposed candidate. Thus, it is almost impossible for one political camp alone to appoint a candidate.
  • Justices are elected for a term of 12 years. There is a maximum age limit of 68 years. To ensure their independence, the re-election of sitting Justices is not possible.
  • There have been controversies about the distribution of the votes for individual parties. In principle, however, the Federal Constitutional Court enjoys a high reputation, which is not least because it is considered distant from politics.

Public Prosecutor

The prosecution services in Germany are part of the executive at the federal level, with the prosecutor general at the Federal Court of Justice. At the level of the states, each has its own public prosecution service.

Gender breakdown of judges

All instances


Supreme court

View source

Judicial Governance

Type of governance system

Ministry of justice model

Ministries of Justice (Federal and State)

  • The federal Ministry of Justice is charged with administering federal courts, while competent ministries (usually ministries of justice) oversee courts at the state level.
  • Most of the responsible officers at the ministries have backgrounds as judges and act with a high degree of consideration of the interests and opinions of their peers. The minister of justice has only limited control over the day-to-day work of the judiciary.

Court Presidents

  • Ministers of justice appoint court presidents at the first instance and appeals levels. In all of the states, appointment councils (Präsidialrat) have to be heard before the government decides on such appointments. The government can, however, overrule the vote of a council. In about half of the states, the consent of a parliamentary committee is also required. Decisions and/or proposals are largely based on merits, i.e., the results of individual evaluations and experience in court administration.
  • Court presidents are typically not selected from the judges of the same court, because they do not fulfil conditions and because there is a policy to bring a court president from outside, in order to avoid controversies among different groups of judges within the court.
  • Decisions on appointments can be reviewed by the courts, although in the case of a vote of a parliamentary committee these decisions are difficult to challenge in practice, unless a significant difference in the qualifications of candidates can be shown.
  • A court president can be removed from office in case of grave disciplinary misconduct, based on a decision of the service court (Richterdienstgericht).
  • Court presidents, in their administrative function, are part of a hierarchy that starts at the local and regional level, goes up through the presidents of courts of appeals, and ends at the ministry of justice. The minister of justice or the president of the Court of Appeal have the power to issue instructions in administrative matters.
  • The renumeration for presidents is 20 per cent higher than the regular salary for judges.
  • Court presidents rely on an administration department, in which other judges of the court work on certain administrative tasks and prepare court presidents’ decisions. These judges assist the president but do not decide in their own right on administrative matters. In larger courts, court presidents often delegate matters to the vice presidents or department heads of the court administration. In some instances, other committees take part in the decision-making by presidents, such as staff councils for non-judicial and judicial staff. The appointment councils (Präsidialrat) are only involved in decisions with respect to judicial staff at the level of the ministry (e.g., promotions).
  • The court presidents are members of the presiding councils – the bodies in charge of allocating judges to panels and setting up rules for allocating cases to judges. While the president can make proposals to the council regarding the allocation of judges and cases, the council can decide autonomously.
  • For more, see:

Presiding Councils (Präsidien) – Committees of Judges

  • Members are elected by all judges of the court (the court president is a legal member of the panel).
  • While the president can make proposals to the council regarding the allocation of judges and cases, the council can decide autonomously.

Appointment Councils (Präsidialräte)

  • There are 17 different councils of judicial appointments, and each state has its own rules.
  • According to those basic rules, the councils are composed of a president of the court, who acts as its chairperson, and of judges, of whom at least one-half are elected by the other judges.

Committees for the Selection of Judges (Richterwahlausschüsse)

  • Judges of the highest federal courts are elected by a joint decision of the competent minister and a selection committee consisting of 16 members of parliament and the 16 competent state ministers (Article 95 para. 2 of the Basic Law). The selection committee helping elect federal court judges does not have any judges among its members.
  • As Article 98 para. 4 of the Basic Law states, the states may establish similar committees (again deciding jointly with the minister of justice). More than half of the states have decided to install such committees. Typically, these committees consist of a majority of members of parliament and a minority of judges either elected by their fellow judges or sitting ex officio (typically as presidents of the highest courts); some states also involve a lawyer, who likewise is elected by their peers.
  • The process and decision of appointment or non-appointment is fully subject to judicial control before the administrative courts.

Service Courts (Richterdienstgerichte)

The service courts themselves are staffed by the presidia of the courts.

Distribution of Responsibility

Ministries of Justice
  • Judicial appointments (including appointments of court presidents)
  • Court administration (de facto: executive judges)
Court presidents
  • Evaluation of judges’ work
  • Transfers of judges
  • Can initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges. Concerning minor disciplinary actions (warnings, for example) the president can decide on their own. Otherwise, the disciplinary court (Richterdienstgericht) decides, including on dismissals.
  • Cannot decide arbitrarily on case assignments and re-assignments. The Presiding Council, consisting of judges elected by their peers, decides on a yearly plan for case assignment. The Council is also responsible for retrieving and reassigning cases.
Service Courts (Richterdienstgerichte)

Function as guardians of judicial independence. Virtually any measure of court administration that could pose a threat to judicial independence may be reviewed by the service courts, with the last word remaining in the hands of (fellow) judges.

Appointment Councils (Präsidialräte)

Judicial appointments, except for those to federal courts, fall within the competence of the state. Appointment councils at the level of the state participate in the process by delivering a written opinion, with supporting reasons, on a judge’s personal and professional aptitude. Hence, the selection should be merit-based.

Committees for the Selection of Judges (Richterwahlausschüsse)

Advise on judicial selection at both the federal and state levels.

Councils of Judges (Richterräte)

These councils participate in all questions (other than appointments) relevant to the professional lives of judges (they can practically veto a measure – e.g., the electronic file or docket or other measures). Exact powers depend on the state.

Presiding Councils (Präsidien)
  • A committee of judges elected by the court’s judge members (the president of the court is a legal member of the panel).
  • The members of the presidia enjoy judicial independence while allocating caseloads.
  • Their competence is limited to questions of allocating judges to panels and of setting up rules for the allocation of cases to judges. In this area, the presidia decide autonomously, without any influence of court presidents.


Under-resourced judiciary

As indicated by the European Commission in its 2023 Rule of Law Report, Germany has not made efforts to provide adequate resources for the justice system, including for judicial salaries. According to a 2022 survey involving 803 judges and prosecutors, 78 per cent of judges and 92 per cent of prosecutors consider the human resources available to be insufficient. The level of salaries in the judiciary, as compared to the national average salary, remains notably low. This, together with the expected retirements of around 10,000 judges by 2030, constitutes a challenge for recruitment in the judiciary, as declared by the German Association of Judges. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly delivered rulings related to the adequacy of judicial salaries.


Civil society organisations have pointed out that the lack of resources have led to an inability of personnel in German courts to handle all pending cases, which, in turn, leads to delays in the judicial process. Such delays reportedly resulted in the release of several defendants in 2022, because the maximum time limits for pre-trial detention had been exceeded.

Danger of politicisation/lack of guarantees of prosecutorial independence

According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the power of German ministers of justice to issue orders to prosecutors in individual cases enables those ministers to “to have a direct influence on a decision of a public prosecutor’s office to issue or, in some cases, not to issue a European Arrest Warrant.” The UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern in its November 2021 Concluding Observations on Germany that the independence of the prosecution services from the executive branch was not ensured in law or in practice, and called for reform.


Germany has not taken steps so far regarding the announced reform of the power of ministers of justice to give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases. The coalition agreement for the current government included the intention to carry out reform in view of the CJEU case law. No specific steps have been taken, however, and no timeline for reform has been announced. Experts have argued, though, that although the law has not been amended, it is interpreted in light of EU law. This means that the criminal justice system has adapted its practice to EU law by subjecting every European Arrest Warrant to a judge’s decision. The competence to issue European Arrest Warrants lies with the magistrate court in the case of criminal prosecution, and with the criminal courts of first instance in cases of the execution of sentences. The public prosecutors’ offices, however, are still tasked, with the preparation and execution of European Arrest Warrants.

Judges’ return to judiciary after holding a political mandate

Judges are allowed to be political party members and can be active in the democratic process. They can, in principle, be elected as members of parliament at the federal and state level, and can engage in political debate. They may not, however, simultaneously perform adjudicative and political functions. Therefore, once elected, their rights and duties as judges are suspended. The legislation establishes the right to reenter the judiciary after the expiry of a political mandate. The question is how their reinstatement could affect public confidence in the judiciary.


The reinstatement of former (extreme) right-wing members of parliament as judges has attracted considerable media attention. There have been disagreements over the interpretation of legislation governing reinstatement. Some have argued that reinstatement is a given, if they file an application, irrespective of the applicant’s behaviour as a member of parliament, because they were not required to act in moderation while holding a political mandate. Others have argued that, where a former judge has made unconstitutional statements or expressed undemocratic views, it was doubtful whether and how such a judge should be accepted back to the bench. The main challenge is to find a balance between measures against extremist judges and the need to uphold judicial independence.


Interestingly, most states foresee security checks for candidates for judicial appointments upon the explicit request of the appointing authority. In two states, standard security checks take place prior to appointments. The aim is to ensure that judges respect the principle of constitutional loyalty before their appointments. Another measure meant to tackle anti-constitutional judicial behaviour is related to the use of disciplinary measures. Removal is only allowed in exceptional cases, however, so people openly making anti-constitutional statements may stay in public service in some cases.

Slow digitalisation of the justice system

Germany has been behind in terms of the digitalisation of court processes. Reform initiatives, however, signal that it is a priority area for the government. According to the president of the Higher Court in Celle, Stefanie Oette, the majority of courts are positive about the need for digital transformation, but digitalisation requires considerable financial investment. She noted that a dispute between the federal government and the states over the amount the federal government should contribute to the costs does not do justice to the importance of the topic, and distracts from the actual issues.


The bar and lawyers’ associations have welcomed governmental proposals to introduce digital documentation of criminal proceedings, initially through audio and video recording. Judges’ and prosecutor’s associations have criticised the proposal, however, and particularly the use of video recordings, highlighting the impact on victims’ willingness to provide testimony and the risk of leaks. Following the mixed reactions to the proposals, in May 2023, the government presented an amended proposal, which now limits digital documentation to audio recording. The possibility to also require a video recording is left open to the states. The proposal has been submitted to the Federal Council; if adopted, the documentation would be introduced in a pilot phase as of 2026, and only fully enter into force in 2030.

Political (including parliamentary) appointments of (Supreme Court) judges

Federal judicial appointments are heavily dominated by the political branches of power. Federal court judges are appointed by the Appointment Committee, composed of the competent federal minister, the competent ministers of the states, and the same number of members selected by the Bundestag. The federal minister remains bound by their constitutional duty to appoint only based on merit.


Germany emerges as a persistent objector to the judicial council model. While judges still influence decision-making on judicial careers in a variety of ways, they do not participate in appointments to federal courts. The involvement of political branches in such appointments is defended by the need for stronger democratic legitimacy for judges. In response, academics have argued that appointment is not the only way to legitimise judges: the primary source of their legitimacy is the quality of their work. This democratisation of the judicial appointment processes bears the risk of politicisation, which can jeopardise judicial independence. The committees tend to increase the influence of party politics on the selection process.


Still, a system that could have easily undermined judicial independence in other contexts does not appear to have had such an effect in Germany. A number of features reduce the risks of undue politicisation. First, due to the involvement of the states in the Appointment Committee, no federal government or parliamentary majority can appoint federal judges independently. Second, there is effective judicial control concerning judicial appointments. Decisions of the minister of justice can be challenged in court. Judicial control helps prevent appointments that are clearly politically motivated. Recently, the Federal Constitutional Court called for merit-based selection. It was emphasised that the Appointment Committee is under an obligation to select a candidate who can be appointed by the competent minister without forcing the minister to violate their duty to appoint only based on merit. Further, the minister can refuse the appointment of a selected candidate if they are manifestly ill-suited for the position. If the minister decides to appoint a selected candidate, even though the professional evaluation found them not to be suitable for the position, the minister has an obligation to state their reasons. Third, a “culture of independence” precludes abuse by politicians. Political actors tend to be aware that they are choosing independent judges who only answer to the laws and the Constitution. There are no sound reports that any German judges have acted under pressure of political parties or other authorities.


Outside the federal-level appointments, judges are involved in judicial governance, including judicial appointments, notwithstanding the absence of a judicial council. Even if final decisions rest with the ministry, they are in a position to give opinions or in, some instances, veto a particular measure. In the past few years, however, judicial associations have continued to call for increased judicial involvement through a judicial council. The association with by far the highest number of members among judges has called for the creation of two bodies of judicial self-governance; a judicial selection committee, composed of a majority of members from state parliaments, and a minority of judges, elected by judges. The second body, the judicial administrative council, consisting of judges, would take over judicial appointments, promotions, and discipline from the ministry of justice, but would be recalled by the above-mentioned selection committee, which was itself to be answerable to the parliament.


The New Association (Neue Richtervereinigung), with only 550 members, has proposed a more radical model. They suggested abandoning the system of advancement of judges, which means that all judges would be equal, irrespective of the court in which they sat. Moreover, court presidents’ positions would only be transferred for a limited time. The thinking behind this proposition is that a junior judge would not need to second guess the senior judges responsible for deciding on their promotion. As regards judicial self-governance, the plan is similar to the one proposed by the main association, in that the body with the judges elected by judges in a majority. Commentators have suggested that “according to the traditional German understanding of democracy, establishing a council in which judges elected by peers have majority to decide on judicial careers would be unconstitutional, as judges elected by judges from among themselves would not be able to trace back their administrative mandate to the German people.” A separate concern is that many judges might not be inclined to be in charge of their professional lives.

Accessibility of court decisions

Civil society organisations have pointed out that less than one per cent of first-instance court decisions are published. This is a problem for both the legal practice and those potentially seeking justice, since they cannot assess their chances of success before the courts. The few decisions that are published often create an incorrect impression that certain views are predominant. Even at the highest courts, an obligation to publish only arises if the decisions are deemed worthy of publication by the courts, and it is often unclear what makes a decision “worthy”. Civil society organisations have called for including an obligation to publish all court decisions as a rule.

National court challenging the primacy of EU law and/or authority of supranational European courts

In its judgment of 5 May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) declared a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB) to be “simply not comprehensible and arbitrary from an objective perspective so that, to this extent, the judgment was rendered ultra vires”. In June 2021, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Germany in connection with this judgment, particularly for undermining the “primacy, effectiveness and uniform application of Union law”. The German government reacted in August 2021 with an official statement, which led to the closure of an infringement case. In this statement, the government formally reaffirmed the principles of autonomy, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law. It expressly recognised the authority of the CJEU in the EU, and declared its intention to use all means at its disposal to actively avoid a repetition of an ultra vires finding in the future.


Experts have suggested that this statement by the German government is, in a sense, an empty promise. The government cannot coerce the FCC to reverse its decisions or abandon its ultra vires and identity control. It is unlikely that the Federal Constitutional Court will abandon its ultra vires and identity review, in light of the government’s promise towards the Commission. However, it has not activated these competences since. It has always declared that it exercises these reviews with restraint, in light of European integration, and in a cooperative manner. Hence, there are differences between the FCC and other constitutional courts that have systematically challenged the CJEU, such as the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (PCT): First, the FCC acted on its own, whereas the PCT acted at the request of the government. Second, the FCC case concerned the isolated issue of an ECB bond-buying scheme, and the issue was resolved, whereas the PCT questioned the primacy of EU law in general. The Polish government has continued attacks on the EU law, lodging new cases with the PCT.

Positive Developments & Achievements

The level of perceived judicial independence in Germany continues to be very high among the general public, and is now high among companies. Overall, 77 per cent of the general population and 71 per cent of companies perceived the level of independence of courts and judges to be “fairly or very good” in 2023. According to data from the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, the level has remained consistently high for both the general public and companies since 2016.

Rankings and Surveys

Expert Recommendations

European Commission rule of law report 2023

Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Germany has made:

  • No further progress on continuing efforts to provide adequate resources for the justice system as part of the new Pact for the rule of law, including on the level of salaries for judges, taking into account European standards on resources and remuneration for the justice system.

On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, it is recommended to Germany to:

  • Step up efforts to ensure adequate resources for the justice system, including on the level of remuneration for judges, taking into account European standards on resources and remuneration for the justice system
GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round, Second Compliance Report, Corruption Prevention, 2022

Adopted by GRECO at its 91st Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 13-17 June 2022)

Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, fourth evaluation round, second interim compliance report, adopted by GRECO at its 91st Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 13-17 June 2022), 

Recommendation vi. GRECO recommended that appropriate measures be taken with a view to enhancing the transparency and monitoring of secondary activities of judges. The Länder are to be invited to contribute to such a reform process. [Partly implemented – all federal courts submit an annual report on the secondary activities of their judges to the relevant Federal Ministries, but transparency of secondary activities needs to be improved, given that the information contained in these reports was not published] 

United Nations Human Rights Committee

Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Germany, 31 November 2021, CCPR/C/DEU/CO/7, available at 

  1. While noting the information provided by the State party about its national legal system, the Committee is concerned that the independence of the prosecution services from the executive branch of the Government, as a corollary to judicial independence, is not ensured in law or in practice (arts. 2 and 14).
  2. The State party should consider introducing legal reforms to ensure the independence of prosecutors from the executive branch of the Government, both in law and in practice, therefore reinforcing judicial independence.
Liberties, Chapter on Germany 2023

Key recommendations

  • Courts should no longer be obligated (or allowed) to inform migration authorities, in cases where people without residence titles file a lawsuit.
  • The system of criminal sanctions must be reformed; custodial sanctions for petty offences should be abolished.
  • Legislation that includes an obligation to publish all court decisions as a rule needs to be introduced

Compliance with European Courts' Judgements

Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

State Performance


Number of unimplemented CJEU rulings related to the judiciary

Judgements with pending implementation

Selected on relevance to the judiciary / rule of law

Joined Cases C 508/18 and C 82/19 PPU


The case was concerned with the power of the ministry of justice in Germany to issue instructions to prosecutors in specific cases and whether, taking into account that power of the minister, the prosecutor’s office could qualify as an authority issuing a European Arrest Warrant. It is explained in the CJEU decision that member states may designate, in their national law, the judicial authority with the competence to issue a European Arrest Warrant. The words “judicial authority” are not limited to designating only the judges or courts of a Member State, but must be construed as designating, more broadly, the authorities participating in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State, including prosecutors. However, where the law confers competence to issue a European Arrest Warrant on an authority that is not a judge or a court, certain safeguards are to be provided to the benefit of the person subject to that arrest warrant. The issuing authority should be able to exercise its responsibilities objectively, taking into account all evidence, without being exposed to the risk that its decision-making power be subject to external directions or instructions, in particular from the government. It must be in a position to give assurance to the judicial authoriuty executing the arrest warrant that it acts independently in the execution of those responsibilities. That independence requires that there are statutory rules and an institutional framework capable of guaranteeing that the issuing authority is not exposed, when adopting the decision to issue such an arrest warrant, to any risk of being subject to a specific instruction from the executive.
In the case of Germany, the minister of justice has an external power to issue instructions to prosecutor’s offices, in particular at the stage when the proportionality of issuing a European Arrest Warrant is examined. The CJEU took note of the fact that German law provides safeguards circumscribing the ministerial power and, hence, the situations in which that power could be exercised in practice are rather rare. The CJEU noted, however, that it is clear that such safeguards cannot wholly rule out the possibility that a decision to issue a European Arrest Warrant may, in a given case, be subject to an instruction from the minister of justice of the relevant state.
The CJEU concluded that public prosecutors’ offices of a Member State that are exposed to the risk of being subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, such as a minister of justice, in connection with the adoption of a decision to issue a European Arrest Warrant cannot be issuing authorities under relevant Council decisions.

View case details

C 508/18 and C 82/19 PPU


European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

State Performance


Implementation record


(43% of total)

Number of leading judgments pending implementation Moderately Low

43 %

Percentage of leading judgements from the last 10 years still pending implementation Moderate



Average time leading judgments have been pending implementation Moderately Low

Judgements with pending implementation

Selected on relevance to the judiciary / rule of law

Saure v Germany (no. 2)


This case concerns the violation of the applicant journalist’s right to receive and impart information on account of the refusal of his request for disclosure of information on the incriminating findings against judges and a public prosecutor in the Land of Brandenburg who had previously worked for the Ministry of Security of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) (violation of Article 10).
The Court considered that “by not examining whether the impugned information could be disclosed in an anonymised form, which would have allowed the applicant journalist to contribute, on a solid factual basis, to a debate on a matter of general interest, and by not engaging in a balancing of the competing interests at issue, the domestic authorities failed to put forward relevant and sufficient reasons to show that the refusal to disclose additional information on the incriminating findings against the judges and public prosecutor was ‘necessary in a democratic society’” (§ 72).
Action Plan/Report awaited.

View case details



Roth v Germany


This case concerns the applicant’s degrading treatment on account of eleven intrusive strip searches he was subjected to in 2014-2017, prior to or after receiving visitors in Straubing Prison, where he serves a life sentence (violation of Article 3). The case furthermore concerns the lack of an effective remedy before a national authority to deal with the substance of the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 (violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3).

As regards this latter violation, the Court noted that although the domestic courts had themselves classified the strip searches as a serious and unlawful interference with the applicant’s personality rights, they considered it sufficient that the courts dealing with the execution of sentences and the Federal Constitutional Court had previously found the strip searches to have been unlawful. They further took into consideration that the fault on the part of the prison staff who had ordered and carried out the searches had at most been minor and that there was no risk of future random searches of the applicant. The Court did not see any reason for concluding that in the applicant’s case the breach of Article 3 by the repeated strip searches was of such a minor nature that compensation would exceptionally be unnecessary (§§95-97).

Action report received on 11 March 2022. An assessment was sent to the authorities.

View case details



Evers v Germany


This case concerns a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial on account of the domestic courts’ refusal, in 2013, to allow that he be heard in person in the proceedings concerning a ban on him having any contact with V., his former partner’s mentally disabled daughter (born in 1987), with whom he had a sexual relationship from 2009 onwards (and until 2010 when V. was placed in care), as a result of which V. became pregnant and gave birth to his son in 2011 (violation of Article 6 § 1). In particular, in the appeal proceedings on the contact ban, the applicant’s request for a personal hearing was rejected on the ground that he had been able to present his case sufficiently in writing. The Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider his relevant constitutional complaint.

Noting that the contact ban was of a far-reaching nature, the European Court concluded that, even though the applicant had maintained his position to continue having sexual contacts with V. and even though the District Court had heard him personally throughout the proceedings for placing V. under guardianship, the issue in the contact ban proceedings was not purely legal and technical, but would have allowed the domestic courts to form their own impression of the applicant and the latter to explain his personal situation (§ 98). There have therefore been no exceptional circumstances that would have justified dispensing the domestic courts with a personal hearing of the applicant (§ 99).

An action plan was received on 20 May 2021 (DH(DD(2021)536).
An action report was received on 26 May 2023. It is currently under assessment.

View case details