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Malta


Basic Facts about the Country

Membership of the European Union

1 May 2004

Membership of the Council of Europe

17 May 2023

Entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights

28 June 1994

Basic Facts about the Judiciary

Budget per inhabitant

Number of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants

8.20

Tiers in the ordinary court system

3

“Superior” Courts: Civil Court, Criminal Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Criminal Appeal

4

“Inferior” Courts: The Court of Magistrates (Malta) and the Court of Magistrates (Gozo)

2

Constitutional Court

Yes

 

One of the “superior” courts, composed of the chief justice as its president and two other judges

 

Has both an original and an appellate jurisdiction. As an appellate court, it hears appeals of decisions of other courts on questions related to the interpretation of the Constitution and on the validity of laws, as well as appeals of decisions on alleged breaches of fundamental human rights.

 

As a court of original jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court decides on questions concerning the validity of elections, including allegations of illegal or corrupt practices or foreign interference. No appeal is possible of a Constitutional Court decision, given its original jurisdiction.

Public Prosecutor

The Prosecutor Service was set up in 2019.

Gender breakdown of judges

All instances

Male
Female

Supreme court

Male
Female
View source

Judicial Governance

Type of governance system

Judicial council model - Moderate

Judicial Appointments Committee

  •  In existence since 2016
  • Composed of the chief justice, two judges elected by peers for a period of four years, a magistrate (sitting in a lower court) elected by peers for a period of four years, the commissioner for administrative investigations (ombudsman), and the president of the Chamber of Advocates

 

 

The Commission for the Administration of Justice (responsible for judicial discipline)

  • Composed of the president of Malta, as the chairperson, the chief justice, as the deputy chairperson, the attorney general, two members elected for four years by the judges from among themselves, two members elected for four years by the magistrates of lower courts from among themselves, two members appointed for four years – one by the prime minister, and the other by the opposition leader – and, finally, the president of the Chamber of Advocates

Judicial Studies Committee

  • Composed of four members – two appointed by the chief justice, and two appointed by the minister responsible for justice
  •  Acts under the general direction of the chief justice

Association of Judges and Magistrates of Malta

  • Created in January 2001 to promote the interests of its members in their professional capacity, as well as the independence of the judiciary; to promote the highest standards of judicial conduct among its members; and to promote the exchange of ideas on the administration of justice

Distribution of Responsibility

Judicial Appointments Committee
  •  Receives and examines expressions of interest from persons interested in being appointed to the office of judge
  •  Receives and examines expressions of interest from persons interested in being appointed to the office of judge of superior courts (other than the office of chief justice) or of magistrate of the lower courts. To be clear, courts are divided into “superior” and “inferior” courts; Superior courts are composed of judges and include the Civil Court, the Criminal Court, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the Constitutional Court. Inferior courts consist of magistrates.
  • Keeps a permanent register of expressions of interest, which is kept secret and accessible only to the members of the Committee and the president of Malta
  • Conducts interviews and evaluations of candidates for judicial offices and, for this purpose, requests information from any public authority it considers reasonable to require
  • Gives advice on appointments to any other judicial office or office in the courts, as the minister responsible for justice may request
  •  Approaches qualified individuals with a view to eliciting interest for the office of a judge or magistrate
  • When a judicial vacancy occurs, the Committee sends the president the names of three candidates it considers to be the most suitable, along with a detailed report on the suitability and merits of these three candidates.
  • The president is entitled to elect a judge or a magistrate only from the names of the three candidates transmitted by the Committee
The Commission for the Administration of Justice (responsible for judicial discipline) (CAJ)
  •  Has jurisdiction over the workings of the courts and the behavior of judges, magistrates, lawyers, and prosecutors, but not over adjudicators who sit in the Small Claims Tribunal, commissioners for justice, mediators or arbitrators.
  • Its functions include (a) supervising the workings of all the superior and inferior courts, and to make such recommendations to the minister responsible for justice as to remedies conducive to the more efficient functioning of these courts; (b) advising the minister responsible for justice on any matter relating to the organisation of the administration of justice; (c) when so requested by the prime minister, advising on any appointment to be made in terms of articles 96, 98, or 100 of the Constitution (appointments of judges and magistrates); (d) drawing up a code or codes of ethics regulating the conduct of members of the judiciary; (e) drawing the attention of any judge or magistrate to any matter which may not be conducive to the proper functioning of courts or to any failure to abide by the relevant code of ethics; and (f) exercising discipline over advocates and prosecutors.
  • Its functions include (a) supervising the workings of all the superior and inferior courts, and to make such recommendations to the minister responsible for justice as to remedies conducive to the more efficient functioning of these courts; (b) advising the minister responsible for justice on any matter relating to the organisation of the administration of justice; (c) when so requested by the prime minister, advising on any appointment to be made in terms of articles 96, 98, or 100 of the Constitution (appointments of judges and magistrates); (d) drawing up a code or codes of ethics regulating the conduct of members of the judiciary; (e) drawing the attention of any judge or magistrate to any matter which may not be conducive to the proper functioning of courts or to any failure to abide by the relevant code of ethics; and (f) exercising discipline over advocates and prosecutors.
  •  Disciplinary procedures against a judge or a magistrate can only be initiated by the chief justice or the minister responsible for justice.
  • The president, however, acting on the advice of the prime minister, removes members of tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies. There is no right of appeal of removal, nor any oversight from the chief justice or the Committee of Judges and Magistrates
Judicial Studies Committee
  • Responsible for the ongoing training of the members of the judiciary, and assisting judges in skills training and their continued professional development, mainly through seminars conducted by both local and foreign experts and speakers

Challenges

Political (including parliamentary) appointments of (Supreme Court) judges

Following constitutional changes made in 2020, the chief justice is appointed by a two-thirds majority in the Maltese Parliament. The Judicial Appointments Committee has no say in such appointments.

 

The chief justice

  • Is the president of the Constitutional Court and of the Court of Appeal
  • Chairs the Judicial Appointments Committee;
  • Is a member of the Commission for the Administration of Justice responsible for judicial discipline.

 

The European Commission’s 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended that Malta “address the need for involvement of the judiciary in the procedure for appointment of the Chief Justice, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and the opinion of the Venice Commission”. As pointed out in the Commission’s 2023 Report, no steps have been taken to change the system of appointment of the chief justice.

 

The current procedure has been criticised on a number of grounds. First, there is no involvement of the judiciary in the appointment of the chief justice. Also, the law allows for the appointment to that office of a person who is not already a judge. Second, the absence of an anti-deadlock mechanism can significantly delay appointments. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission pointed out that, while the cross-party consensus in Parliament could increase the credibility of the successful candidate, the likelihood of candidates lobbying among politicians could undermine the process. The Venice Commission also highlighted the likelihood of the election ending in deadlock. According to the Commission, in the event of a prolonged stalemate in the Parliament, letting the Supreme Court judges elect the chief justice from among themselves would be a better solution. At that point, the government pointed out that no agreement on an anti-deadlock mechanism could be reached with the opposition. As highlighted by the European Commission, an anti-deadlock mechanism for the appointment of the Chief Justice has still not been introduced.

 

Another issue raising concerns is the appointment procedure for members of specialised tribunals. The members of such tribunals are often appointed by the responsible minister.

 

There have been some concerns regarding the decision-making by such tribunals. For example, in the S.H. v. Malta, judgment of 22 December 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) pointed out that it took the International Protection Appeals Tribunal a mere 24 hours to review the first-instance decision on the asylum seeker’s application by the International Protection Agency and, within that timeframe, it could only undertake a superficial assessment of all the documentation presented. In the ECtHR’s view, the brief decision by the Tribunal, confirming the incongruous conclusions reached at the first instance and providing no further reasoning, supported this conclusion. The ECtHR also highlighted that the government was only able to invoke one situation whereby the Tribunal overturned the Agency’s decision. In the remaining 478 reviews undertaken in 2021, the Tribunal confirmed the first-instance decision. There was a clear tendency, therefore, on the part of the Tribunal to automatically confirm the Agency’s decisions within a short timeframe, as happened in the applicant’s case. As a result, an asylum seeker was not offered effective guarantees protecting him from arbitrary removal. Further applications seeking asylum were treated in the same way and, hence, he was deprived of a rigorous individual assessment of his asylum claim. The Tribunal confirmed the Agency’s incongruent conclusions without providing any reasoning. While the case revealed systemic problems, the ECtHR did not demand general measures in this judgment, because it was the first case of this kind, and the parties have referred to legislative amendments to the process.

 

In its Recovery and Resilience Plan, the government has committed to carry out a review of the independence of the specialised tribunals, in communication with the Venice Commission, and the corresponding legislative changes are to enter into force by 31 March 2026.

 

Stakeholders in consultation with the European Commission expressed concern that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated by a politically appointed chief justice and a minister responsible for justice and that, overall, the Commission was politicised.

National court challenging the primacy of EU law and/or authority of supranational European courts

In the case of Michael Christian Felsberger et vs TSG Interactive Gaming Europe Ltd, with the ruling delivered on 21 July 2023, Judge Toni Abela refused to enforce an Austrian court ruling against a Maltese gaming company, as requested by plaintiffs. His ruling made use of contentious amendments to the Gaming Act from earlier in 2023 that granted gaming companies immunities from legal action. It essentially asserted the predominance of national law over EU law, as derived from the Constitution. The Maltese Constitution has two provisions – Article 6, asserting the Constitution’s supremacy, and Article 65, introduced in 2003, after Malta’s accession to the EU, stating that the Parliament would make laws in conformity with full respect for international and regional obligations, including those assumed under EU law. Under the European Union Act of 2003, EU law is considered binding on Malta.

 

According to Maltese academics, it is too early to argue that the Polish scenario – of governmental instrumentalisation of courts against the EU – is likely; it remains to be seen whether Article 6 of the Constitution is being weaponised to challenge the primacy of EU law. However, while the above-mentioned decree challenged the primacy of the EU law to support governmental policy regarding gaming industry, it may very well have been driven by pragmatism, rather than a decisive EU sentiment. If so, the contestation of EU law will not be as systemic as in some other instances. Also, while judicial appointments have been politicised until recently, and remain so as regards the appointment of the chief justice, it is hard to say that the Maltese judiciary has been captured. The perceived level of judicial independence is also quite high both among the general public and companies. In 2023, 66 per cent of the public and 65 per cent of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges as “fairly or very good.” According to the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, however, perceived judicial independence among the general public has slightly decreased compared to 2022.

Under-resourced judiciary

The level of judicial resources remains a concern. The number of judges continues to be one of the lowest in EU (8.2 per 100,000 inhabitants), which potentially affects the efficiency of the justice system. New members of the judiciary have complained about a lack of basic resources and skilled support staff for the implementation of their tasks.

Slow proceedings

Most efficiency indicators, as shown in the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, have worsened. For instance, the estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance is 1,356 days, the longest in the EU. Limited progress has been registered regarding the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance, which decreased from 550 to 529 days. Stakeholders have raised concerns in relation to the efficiency of justice, including as regards criminal cases of domestic violence.

 

While the European Commission pointed to some progress since 2022 in its 2023 Rule of Law Report, it called for stronger efforts to improve the efficiency of justice and reduce the length of proceedings.

Positive Developments & Achievements

Steps have been made to depoliticise judicial appointments. Judges are now appointed by the president of Malta, at the recommendation of the Judicial Appointments Committee. The Committee was established in 2016 to give advice to the prime minister about the eligibility and merit of candidates. The association Repubblika argued that the prime minister’s decisive power in the appointments of judges and magistrates raised doubts about their independence. In the Repubblika ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), of April 2021, the CJEU concluded that the involvement of the prime minister did not breach EU law. The creation in 2016 of the Judicial Appointments Committee served to reinforce judicial independence in Malta, compared to the situation arising from the constitutional provisions in force when Malta acceded to the European Union. The Court stated that the involvement of such a body could render the appointment process more objective, by limiting the leeway available to the prime minister in the exercise of the powers in question. Also, the exercise of power would be circumscribed by the requirements of professional experience, laid down in the Constitution, to be fulfilled by candidates. Although the prime minister could decide to submit to the president of the republic the appointment of a candidate not put forward by the Committee, the prime minister was required to communicate reasons for doing so. According to the Court, provided that the prime minister exercised that power only in exceptional circumstances, and adhered to strict and effective compliance with the obligation to state reasons, that power is not such as to give rise to legitimate doubts concerning the independence of the candidates selected.

As a result of the May 2020 constitutional reform, the prime minister is no longer involved in judicial appointments. Should a vacancy in any office occur, the Judicial Appointments Committee sends the president of Malta the names of three candidates it considers most suitable, with a detailed report on the suitability and merits of these candidates. The president is then entitled to elect a judge or magistrate exclusively from the names of the three candidates transmitted by the Committee.

Rankings and Surveys

Expert Recommendations

European Commission, Rule of Law Report, July 2023

Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Malta has made:

  • No progress on addressing the need for involvement of the judiciary in the procedure for appointment of the Chief Justice, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
  • Some progress on strengthening efforts to improve the efficiency of justice, particularly to reduce the length of proceedings.
  • Some progress on addressing challenges related to the length of investigations of high-level corruption cases; and no progress on establishing a robust track record of final judgments.

 

On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, and in addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is recommended to Malta to:

  • Take steps to address the need for involvement of the judiciary in the procedure for appointment of the Chief Justice, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
  • Further strengthen efforts to improve the efficiency of justice, particularly to reduce the length of proceedings.
  • Step up measures to address challenges related to the length of investigations of high-level corruption cases, including by establishing a robust track record of final judgments.
Fourth Evaluation Round, Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report

Adopted by GRECO at its 92nd Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 28 November – 2 December 2022)

  • 22. GRECO recommended that the system of judicial accountability be significantly strengthened, notably by extending the range of disciplinary sanctions to ensure better proportionality and by improving the transparency of complaints processes.
  • 25. GRECO takes note of the previously acknowledged achievements in respect of judicial disciplinary procedures and the current intention by the authorities to take steps to improve the transparency of complaints processes. The actual situation remains the same as in the previous compliance report as no further steps have been taken, e.g. no published statistics of complaints received, types of breaches and sanctions, etc.
  • 26. GRECO concludes that this recommendation remains partly implemented.

 

Recommendation vi

  • 27. GRECO recommended that (i) a compulsory induction training programme, including consideration of judicial ethics, be developed; (ii) that mentoring arrangements for new judges, exploring the ethical implications of appointment, be formalised; and (iii) that a regular programme of in-service training be provided along with targeted guidance and counselling on corruption prevention topics and judicial ethics for the various persons required to sit in court (judges, magistrates, and adjudicators of boards and tribunals).
  • 30. …There have been no considerable achievements in respect of the first two elements. GRECO welcomes the rise in the Judicial Studies Committee’s budget for training purposes and notes that five training sessions on judicial ethics and corruption prevention have been offered in the past year, while one is scheduled for November 2022. These initiatives need to be further developed and consolidated. However, as no other new information has been reported by the authorities concerning a formalised compulsory induction training and mentoring, GRECO cannot conclude that this recommendation has been dealt with more than partly.
  • 31. GRECO concludes that recommendation vi remains partly implemented.

Compliance with European Courts' Judgements

Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

State Performance

0

Number of unimplemented CJEU rulings related to the judiciary

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

State Performance

Moderately poor

Implementation record

15

Number of leading judgments pending implementation Moderately Low

45 %

Percentage of leading judgements from the last 10 years still pending implementation High

64

months

Average time leading judgments have been pending implementation Significant
Non-Implementation of European Courts Judgments and the Rule of Law | EIN & DRI

Judgements with pending implementation

Selected on relevance to the judiciary / rule of law

Grace Gatt v. Malta

This case concerns the lack of independence and impartiality of the bodies which decided on the applicant’s dismissal from police force in 2015 (violation of Article 6§1).

As indicated in the 21 July 2020 action report, in December 2019, the Maltese authorities amended disciplinary regulations to address the lack of impartiality of the Board deciding on police dismissals, including through ensuring that the disciplinary boards are composed of public officers not directly subordinated to the Head of Department where the potentially dismissed person works and through allowing the Board decision to be challenged. An updated action plan/report is awaited.

View case details

46466/16

08-01-2020

S.H. v Malta

This case concerns the refusal of applicant’s asylum requests since his arrival to Malta in 2019 without an assessment of his claim as to the risk faced on his return to Bangladesh and lack of access to an effective remedy (violations of Articles 3 and 13). The Court pointed out that it took the International Protection Appeals Tribunal a mere twenty-four hours to review the first-instance decision on the asylum seekers application by the International Protection Agency and within that timeframe, it could only undertake a superficial assessment of all the documentation presented. In the Court’s view, a brief decision, confirming the incongruous conclusions reached at the first instance and providing no further reasoning, supported this conclusion. The ECtHR also highlighted that the Government was only able to invoke one situation whereby the Tribunal overturned the Agency’s decision. In the remaining 478 reviews undertaken in 2021 the Tribunal confirmed the first-instance decision. Therefore, there was a clear tendency on the part of the Tribunal to automatically confirm the Agency’s decision within a short timeframe, as happened in the instant case. Hence, asylum seeker was not offered effective guarantees protecting him from an arbitrary removal.

Action plan/report is awaited by 22 November 2023.

On 1st June 2023, the Maltese authorities informed that a reassessment of the applicant’s request for asylum is envisaged. In light of the Court’s judgment, the International Protection Agency will re-open the applicant’s subsequent application, which was previously deemed inadmissible. During the consideration of the applicant’s subsequent application, the applicant has the right to remain on Maltese territory until a final decision has been taken.

View case details

37241/21

22-05-2023

Galea and Pavia v Malta

These cases concern the excessive length of criminal proceedings as well as of constitutional redress proceedings, and the lack of effective remedies thereof. The European Court found that the constitutional redress proceedings, an effective remedy in theory for allegations of violations of Convention rights, were marked by systemic flaws, notably insufficient amount of compensation awards and lack of expeditiousness, which rendered it ineffective in practice at the relevant time for length of proceedings complaints.

The Committee of Ministers last examined this case at its 1428th meeting (March 2022) on the basis of an action report submitted on 15 February 2021. The Committee welcomed preventive measures meant to ameliorate delays in proceedings and reducing the backlog of cases, but noted that the information provided was insufficient to show a clear reduction in the overall length of proceedings. The Committee also did not receive information about acceleratory and compensatory remedies available or envisaged and invited the Maltese authorities to submit updated information.

View case details

77209/16

11-06-2020

Shorazova v. Malta

This case concerns the lack of procedural safeguards for the freezing of all applicant’s property in Malta between 2014 and 2021 at legal assistance request of Kazakh authorities, likely tainted by political persecution motives. The Government submitted an action report on 2 December 2022. The authorities suggested that the violation found by the Court stems from an inadequate assessment carried out by the authorities and domestic courts in issuing and extending the freezing order in question. As a result, and in order to ensure that no similar violations occur in the future, the judgement has been disseminated to the judiciary and to the Attorney General’s Office.

View case details

51853/19

03-06-2022