Introduction
Basic Facts about the Country
Basic Facts about the Judiciary
Judicial Governance
Distribution of Responsibility
Challenges
Rankings and Surveys
Expert Recommendations
Compliance with European Courts' Judgements
Further Readings
Latvia
Basic Facts about the Country
Membership of the European Union
1 May 2004
Membership of the Council of Europe
10 February 1995
Entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights
27 June 1997
Basic Facts about the Judiciary
Budget per inhabitant
€ 37.46 (2020 data) European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ)
Overall number of judges
Number of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants
29.05
Tiers in the ordinary court system
3
First Instance Courts
9 district/city courts dealing with civil and criminal cases
1 district court dealing with administrative cases
1 specialised district court, the court of economic cases (financial crimes)
Higher Courts (appeals)
5 regional courts dealing with civil and commercial cases
1 regional administrative court
Supreme Court
1 (criminal, civil, and administrative cases)
Constitutional Court
Yes
Constitutional Court judges are confirmed by the Saeima (The parliament).
Three are confirmed following a proposal by not fewer than ten members of the Saeima, two following a proposal by the Cabinet of Ministers, and two more following a proposal by the Supreme Court plenary session.
Prosecution
An independent judicial institution under the authority of the prosecutor general
Judicial Governance
Type of governance system
Judicial Council
- Fifteen members, eight permanent and seven elected.
- Permanent members include the presidents of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, the minister of justice, prosecutor general, chairperson of the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, chairpersons of Councils of Advocates, Notaries and Bailiffs.
- Elected members include six judges, elected by a conference of judges (there are quotas for district and regional court judges) and one judge elected by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court.
- Term of office is four years. Re-election is possible, but no more than twice.
- An elected member of the Judicial Council cannot simultaneously be a member of the Disciplinary Committee, Disciplinary Court, Judicial Qualifications Committee or Judicial Ethics Commission.
- The Ombudsman and the Director of the Court Administration and judicial associations’ representatives may participate in the work of the Judicial Council in an advisory capacity.
- The president of the Supreme Court is the chair of the Judicial Council; deputy chair is elected from among judge members
Disciplinary Committee
- Includes nine judges: one judge of the Supreme Court Department of Administrative Cases, one judge of the Supreme Court Department of Civil Cases, one judge of the Supreme Court Department of Criminal Cases, one judge of Administrative Regional Court, one judge of the Civil Collegium of a Regional Court, one judge of the Criminal Collegium of a Regional Court, one judge of the Administrative District Court, two judges of a district (city) court, where one is specialised in civil cases and the other in criminal cases
- Elected for four years at the Judges’ Conference
Disciplinary Court (at the Supreme Court)
- Consists of six judges of departments of the Supreme Court – two each from the Department of Civil Cases, the Department of Criminal Cases and the Department of Administrative Cases, elected by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court for five years.
- The chair of the Disciplinary Court is approved by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court among members of the Disciplinary Court for a term of five years.
- Authority of a member of the Disciplinary Court to terminate if the term of office of a judge in the Department of Civil Cases, in the Department of Criminal Cases or in the Department of Administrative Cases comes to an end, or if a judge has had a disciplinary penalty imposed. In this case, the Plenary Session elects a new member of the Disciplinary Court
Judicial Qualification Committee
- Composed of nine judges – three judges of the Supreme Court, three judges from regional courts, two judges of district (city) courts, and one judge from the Land Registry office
- Elected for a term of four years at the Judges’ Conference
Judicial Ethics Commission
- Ten members, elected by the Conference of Judges by secret ballot, including two members from among candidates nominated by judges of the land registry divisions, three from among the candidates nominated by the judges of the district (city) courts, three from among the candidates nominated by the judges of the district courts, and two from among the candidates nominated by the Supreme Court.
- The term of office of a member of the Judicial Ethics Commission is four years. A member may be re-elected, but not more than two times in a row.
- The status of a member of the Judicial Ethics Commission is incompatible with the performance of the duties of a member of the Disciplinary Board of Judges, a member of the Disciplinary Court, a member of the Judicial Qualification Commission or a member of the Council for the Judiciary.
- The Judicial Ethics Commission may invite a judge of the Constitutional Court, a representative of professions belonging to the judiciary, an ethics specialist, or a recognised legal expert to participate in its meeting in an advisory capacity
Conference of Judges
- Consists of judges of the Supreme Court, regional courts, district (city) courts, and land registry divisions, who participate in its work with right of voting.
Distribution of Responsibility
The Council provides an opinion:
- On budget requests of courts
- On the candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court (provides an opinion to the Saeima)
- On the candidates for the position of a judge of the Supreme Court (provides an opinion to the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court)
The Council submits proposals to the Saeima:
- On the total number of judges in the district (city) courts, in Administrative District Courts, Regional Courts, Administrative Regional Courts, and the Senate.
- On dismissal of the president of the Supreme Court from the office of their own will or due to appointment to other office
- On dismissal of judges from the post due to their state of health, if that prevents them from continuing to work as a judge, or if they have received negative statement in re-assessment of their professional activity as a judge
- On the most suitable candidate for the position of prosecutor general
Decisions of the Judicial Council in conceptual and organisational issues related to court system:
- Development and approval of Regulation of the Council for the Judiciary
- Approval of Regulation of the Judges’ Conference
- Approval of Regulation of the Judicial Ethics Commission
- Approval of Regulation of the Judicial Qualifications Committee
- Convocation of the Judges’ Conference, setting issues to be included in the agenda
- ⦁ Determination of district (city) courts and their courthouses, as well as the area of activity and location of district (city) courts and their courthouses
- Determination of the area of activity of regional courts and courthouses of regional courts
- Determination of the number of judges in every district (city) and regional court (upon the proposal of the minister of justice)
- Determination of number of judges in Departments of the Senate (upon the proposal of the president of the Supreme Court)
- Adoption of decisions on the transfer of a vacant judge’s positions within the area of court’s activity (upon the proposal of the minister of justice)
- Determination of the procedure for judges’ selection, traineeships, and qualification examinations
- Approval of regulations of competition for selection of candidates for the post of a judge
- Determination of content and procedure for assessing judges’ professional knowledge and samples of documents necessary for assessment
- Approval of the judges’ list, pursuant to which regular assessment of judges’ professional knowledge will be performed successively
- Approval of basic principles for judges’ specialisation
- Approval of the procedure for determining the workload of a case
- Approval of information submitted by chairs of courts about standards of terms of review of cases in courts
- Confirmation of the contents of curricula for judges and employees of the Supreme Court (upon the proposal of the president of the Supreme Court or the minister of justice)
- Hearing of the annual report on work prepared by the Court Administration
- Development of guidelines in connection with other organisational issues of courts
Decisions of the Judicial Council related to issues of judicial careers:
- Decision on the transferring of a judge to work within the same court instance (pursuant to recommendation of the minister of justice)
- Transfer of a judge to another place of performance of judge’ duties within the area of court activity (at the proposal of the minister of justice, with the consent of the judge)
- Transfer of a judge to a higher court instance (to regional court – based on a positive opinion of the Judicial Qualification Committee; to the Supreme Court – upon a recommendation of the president of the Supreme Court, based on a positive opinion of the general meeting of a corresponding department of the Senate)
- Transfer of a judge to a lower court instance (with the consent of the judge)
- In cases of a vacant post or the temporary absence of a judge of a regional court, the Judicial Council may instruct a judge of another regional court or judge of a district (city) court to substitute for the judge absent (upon the recommendation of the minister of justice, on the basis of a positive statement of the Judicial Qualification Committee) for a period not exceeding two years.
- In the case of a vacant post or temporary absence of a judge of the Senate, the Judicial Council may instruct a judge of a regional court (upon the recommendation of the president of the Supreme Court, on the basis of a positive statement of the respective department of the Senate) to substitute a judge for the period not exceeding two years.
- Appointment of the chair of the district (city) court and the chair of the regional court for a term of five years, and release of the chair of the court from office prematurely on their own choice or at the recommendation of the minister of justice if the chair of a court has committed gross violations or is unable to perform their duties to ensure the quality management of the administrative work of the court
- Applications to the Constitutional Court – In cases and procedures specified by the Constitutional Court Law, the Judicial Council may submit an application regarding the initiation of a matter to the Constitutional Court, appealing against the compliance of legal standards with the Constitution, if these touch upon issues related to judiciary
- Proceedings may be initiated before the Disciplinary Committee by the minister of justice, court presidents, chiefs of the land registry divisions of district courts, and the Judicial Ethics Commission.
- The Committee organises a comprehensive preliminary examination of the materials received, and requests a written explanation from the judge. It may decide to impose disciplinary sanctions. These are a note, reprimand, or reduction of the salary of the post for a period of up to one year. It may propose removal from office, as well as send the materials of the disciplinary matter to the Prosecutor General’s Office for a decision on the initiation of a criminal case, or terminate the disciplinary matter
- A judge against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated can appeal against an unfavorable decision of the Judicial Disciplinary Committee (disciplinary punishment or removal) to the Disciplinary Court. The complaint is typically heard in a closed session.
- The judge may appeal the statement of the Judicial Qualification Committee to the Disciplinary Court
- Regularly assesses judge’s professional activities, before nominating a district (city) court judge for re-appointment or confirmation, without limitation of the term of office
- Assesses the professional activity of a judge and, if necessary, the judge’s professional preparedness for a vacant judge’s position, if the judge applies to be transferred to another district (city) court or regional court or their courthouses, or a district (city) court applies for replacement of a judge of a regional court during the vacancy or absence of a judge. If several candidates have received a positive opinion apply for one vacancy, the Judicial Qualification Committee shall adopt a motivated decision and transfer the most suitable candidate.
- Performs an assessment of all judges’ professional activities every five years
- Carries out an extraordinary assessment of a judge’s professional activity when deciding on the transfer or replacement of a judge, as well as on the basis of a decision of the Judicial Disciplinary Committee or upon a proposal of the president of the Court
- Upon request of the person who has the right to initiate a disciplinary matter, as well as upon request of the Disciplinary Board of Judges or the Disciplinary Court, to provide opinions on the interpretation of ethical norms and violations
- Upon its own initiative or upon the request of judges, to explain and analyse the norms of the Code of Ethics for Judges, as well as to advise judges on ethical issues for judges
- To compile and prepare for the publication of findings and explanations regarding the interpretation and application of ethical norms
- To discuss violations of ethical norms
- To develop the norms of the Code of Ethics for Judges, and submit them for approval to the Conference of Judges
- To decide on the initiation of a disciplinary matter
- Elects six judge members of the Judicial Council, nine members of the Disciplinary Committee, ten members of the Judicial Ethics Commission, and nine members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission
- Court Administration handling all administrative duties related to courts is directly subordinate to the minister of justice. Its director is appointed by the minister of justice for a term of five years, and can be reappointed without limitation.
- Court Administration has vast power in court budgetary matters. It prepares the budgets for district and regional courts. This draft is sent to the minister of justice, who asks the Judicial Council for an opinion; if the Judicial Council disagrees with the draft budget, the minister of justice can ignore this, and proceed with presenting the budget to the minister of finance.
Challenges
Excessive budgetary or other powers of the minister of justice allowing undue influence
National experts have argued that the Ministry of Justice can exert influence over the judiciary, through controlling the Court Administration, a body in charge of administrative matters related to the judiciary. It is suggested that the actions of the director of the Court Administration, whom the minister appoints, can be heavily influenced by the knowledge that their reappointment depends on the minister.
According to a survey from 2021, Latvian judges believed their work was under excessive political pressure at the hands of the minister of justice. The Judicial Council president, Aigars Strupišs said that, while judges do not experience pressure in specific cases, they notice systemic dependence on the executive branch, through budget distribution and the administration of the courts. In his opinion, the judicial system needed to be distanced from the executive branch. He hinted, however, that existing arrangements were particularly problematic, because of the way the incumbent minister behaved. The chairperson attributed the judges’ opinion about negative effects of the involvement of the minister of justice on the independence of the judiciary to the incumbent minister’s criticisms of judicial decisions.
Getting the Judicial Council to take over the administrative management of the justice system, in particular as regards budgetary aspects, from the Court Administration, a body under the Ministry of Justice, is under consideration as part of the Council’s strategy for 2021-2025.
Political (including parliamentary) appointments of (Supreme Court) judges
The appointments to the Supreme Court are structured in such a way that the members of parliament can easily decide not on the merits, but on political considerations, and get away with it. The parliament’s refusal to appoint former Constitutional Court President Sanita Osipova to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding her credentials, raised concerns. The Latvian government insisted that the decision not to confirm Osipova as a judge of the Supreme Court “was an exceptional case, followed by strict condemnation, and does not indicate systemic problems in the procedure for appointing or confirming judges.” However, even if most appointments are unproblematic, the system of appointments remains vulnerable to politicisation in the absence of adequate formal safeguards against undue political influence.
In its 2023 report, the European Commission emphasised the absence of safeguards against undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges, noting that no progress had been made in implementing its recommendation in its 2022 report. A problem will arise if the appointing political authority (in this case, the parliament) does not follow the recommendations or opinions of an independent and competent authority drawn from the judiciary (in this case, the Supreme Court president). Unsuccessful candidates cannot request judicial review against the parliament’s decision, which also does not have to contain reasons for the rejection.
The Saeima remains involved in judicial appointments at the district and regional court levels, appointing judges based on a non-binding proposal from the Judicial Council. According to the Latvian authorities, however, all the proposals made by the Council have been followed by the Saeima, with one single exception, where the candidate did not meet the required qualifications. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) viewed this arrangement as satisfactory. Still, the report underscored the importance of minimising the role of both the executive and the legislative branches in the appointment of judges, and encouraged the authorities to keep this matter under review, to prevent any risk of improper political influence.
Politicians’ hostile rhetoric towards judges
In 2021, Minister of Justice Jānis Bordāns attacked the Supreme Court and Judicial Council president Aigars Strupišs, accusing him of violating the norms of judicial ethics. The Ministry withdrew the resolution containing these accusations after the minister’s attacks were found by the Judicial Ethics Commission to be baseless. The minister also attempted to turn the Council against its president in a vote, with the claim that the president was damaging the reputation of the judiciary and preventing foreign investment, by commenting on a court’s decision to the media. Again, the Judicial Ethics Commission disagreed with the minister’s evaluation, and found that Chairman Strupišs was acting within his competence when he spoke to the media about his belief that a particular trial was too lengthy, and that many lessons should be drawn from this trial for the Latvian justice system.
Attacks by members of parliament against constitutional court judges have adversely affected the Court’s reputation. Commentators have highlighted that these attacks were not comments disagreeing with the Court’s reasoning in specific judgments, but attacks on the Court’s legitimacy. While certain political parties (New Unity and AP!) supported the Court and condemned attacks by other members of the parliament, the backlash against the authority of courts is still apparent, and makes the judiciary vulnerable.
Politicisation of and/or pressure on the Constitutional Court
The Latvian Constitutional Court is vulnerable to politicisation. After Constitutional Court President Ineta Ziemele left her position in October 2020, the parliament struggled to fill the vacancy – none of the five nominees managed to acquire the necessary support in a parliamentary sitting in December 2020. The reason for this was the ongoing questioning in the parliament of the necessity for the Constitutional Court as an institution. The voting took place soon after the Constitutional Court’s November 2020 ruling demanding legal protection for same sex couples, which many perceived as an attack on traditional values. The ruling led to the criticism not only of the judgment, but also of the court, and accusations that it had overstepped its competence, along with calls for its abolition.
On 9 December 2021, the parliament appointed Irēna Kucina to the Constitutional Court, but her candidacy was plagued by controversy; her previous role was to act as President Egils Levits’ legal advisor, and there were reports that Levits had allegedly held phone calls with parliamentarians from the AP! party, in which he threatened to criticise the party if it failed to vote for Kucina, his preferred candidate, for the judicial post.
The lack of support in the parliament for the candidacy of the former Constitutional Court President Osipova for the Supreme Court was also troubling for observers. The members of parliament from the conservative wing rejected Osipova in connection with the constitutional court’s decision from November 2020 regarding same-sex couples’ rights, fearing that she would use her position on the Supreme Court to give recognition to same-sex partnerships.
Rankings and Surveys
Expert Recommendations
Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Latvia has (made):
- No progress on initiating a process in view of ensuring adequate safeguards against undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments.
On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, it is recommended to Latvia to:
- Take measures to ensure adequate safeguards against undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments.
European Commission Rule of Law Report 2023
Adopted by GRECO at its 82nd Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 18-22 March 2019)
- 23. GRECO recommended:
- Strengthening the decisive influence of the relevant self-governing judicial bodies (e.g. the Judicial Council and Judicial Qualification Board) in the appointment, reappointment and career progression of the judiciary
- Reconsidering the scope of powers held by the Saeima in this area, notably, by restricting it to the confirmation of judicial appointments as recommended by the relevant judicial bodies, with a view to better dispelling the risks of political influence.
- 24.GRECO recalls that, in the Second Interim Compliance Report, it considered this recommendation as partly implemented. GRECO gave credit to a number of measures underway, including draft legislation, to broaden the powers of the Judicial Council. GRECO however stressed that the issue of the decisive influence of the Council in respect of the appointment, re-appointment and dismissal of all categories of judges still remained to be addressed. GRECO also reiterated its misgivings about risks of political interference in these key moments of an individual’s judicial career.
- 25.The Latvian authorities state that the amendments to the Law on Judicial Power entered into force on 12 February 2018. They significantly curtail the powers of the executive and the legislative in the judiciary since it is now the Judicial Council which decides in the following areas: appointing and dismissing the chief judge of a district court; nominating candidates for the position of judge of a district or a regional court (based on the considerations of the Judicial Qualification Board); deciding on transfers; determining the procedure for selection, traineeship and qualification exams; approving the content of training programmes; confirming divisions of regional courts; taking decisions on the re-organisation plans of courts; preparing and submitting budget requests regarding its functioning to the Ministry of Finance.
- 26. With particular reference to the second component of recommendation vii, it was decided that the Saeima continues to be responsible for the formal appointment of judges sitting at district and regional courts, on the basis of the proposals made by the Judicial Council. The authorities submit information on the relevant appointment processes since the adoption of the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Latvia: all the proposals made by the Judicial Council were followed by the Saeima, with one single exception where the candidate was not retained. This was not a politically inspired decision, but rather reflected on the unsuitability of the candidate (inappropriate personal qualities of the candidate, attitude towards work and relationship with colleagues, unfavourable reference of chief judge where apprenticeship was conducted).
- 27.GRECO welcomes the developments reported to enlarge and strengthen the responsibilities of the Judicial Council, as already anticipated by the authorities in previous compliance reports, but now effective following the adoption of amendments to the Law on Judicial Power. This move meets the first part of recommendation vii.
- 28. With respect to the second component of recommendation vii, GRECO notes that, in relation to the aforementioned legislative reform context, the authorities decided to retain the role of the Saeima to formal appointment of judicial office, on the basis of the non-binding opinion of the Judicial Council. Since the adoption of the Fourth 6 Round Evaluation Report on Latvia, in 2012, the Saeima has invariably followed the proposal of the Judicial Council, the only exception being in one case where the candidate did not meet the required qualification. This part of recommendation vii is also to be regarded as complied with.
- 29. Against this background, GRECO concludes that recommendation vii has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
- 30. Having said that, GRECO has repeatedly underscored the importance of minimising the role of both the executive and the legislative in the appointment of judges. …. GRECO can, therefore, only encourage the authorities to keep this matter under review, and to reconsider their position when developing or further refining legislation/rules in this domain, in order to better prevent any risk of improper political influence in judicial appointments.
Compliance with European Courts' Judgements
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
State Performance
0
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
State Performance
Good
Implementation record
8
16 %
15
months
Judgements with pending implementation
Selected on relevance to the judiciary / rule of law
Pilags v Latvia
The present case concerns a breach of the right to a fair trial as the domestic courts did not properly examine the applicant’s allegations of incitement in the administrative offence proceedings against him in 2013 (violation of Article 6 § 1).
On 23 January 2023 the authorities submitted an Action Plan (see DH-DD(2023)97). The authorities believe that the cause of this procedural shortcoming was not a legal provision of the Code of Administrative Offences per se, but rather the lack of due diligence on behalf of the domestic courts, since it was their task to examine the facts of the case and to take the necessary steps to establish the truth in order to determine whether there was any incitement; however, they did not provide any separate and independent assessment of the evidence and other materials pertaining to the undercover operation conducted by the KNAB.
Legal framework
The legal framework, which was applicable at the material time, namely, Article 2896 of the former Latvian Code on the Administrative Offences, provided a procedure for the competent domestic courts to examine the classified information, which was found relevant for the adjudication of the administrative offence proceedings. Currently, a similar provision is included in Article 179, paragraph 3, of the Law on the Administrative Liability which provides the competent domestic courts with the authority to examine, if necessary, classified information, such as, inter alia, information concerning the authorisation and course of undercover police operations, the contents of which would be required by the courts to effectively and adequately examine an incitement plea.
Publication and dissemination
The judgment was published and disseminated to all authorities directly concerned. It was also discussed in 2022 at the annual event “Current Human Rights Issues in Latvia”.
66897/13
03-03-2022
Straume v Latvia
This case concerns the domestic courts’ failure to apply Convention standards and to properly assess the relevant facts of the applicant’s employment dispute who was the chairperson of the Trade Union board (violation of Article 11, read in the light of Article 10), as well as failure to ensure the rights to both a public hearing and the public delivery of the judgment in 2012-2013 (violation of Article 6).
On 30 May 2023 the authorities submitted an Action Report, which is currently under assessment.
59402/14
02-09-2022
Lapsa v Latvia
The case concerns the effectiveness of domestic proceedings concerning the applicant’s child death as a result of alleged medical negligence in 2008-2019 (violation of Article 2, procedural limb).
An Action Report was submitted on 23 May 2023, referred to general measures, including those (1) accelerating proceedings, introduced by several amendments to the Criminal Code in 2018, 2020, 2021 and 2022, (2) improving quality of forensic expertise, and (3) introducing a mechanism for financial compensation for damage cause by medical negligence.
57444/19
20-10-2022