Kosovo

Progress on the rule of law in Kosovo remains slow due to institutional and political challenges that hinder key reforms and alignment with European standards. A major obstacle  is the lack of willingness to actually implement the plans to improve the rule of law and to work together within the parliament and with the Venice Commission. 

Kosovo already has a rule of law strategy for the years 2021 to 2026 aiming to improve citizens’ trust in public institutions. The strategy includes  measures to increase judicial and prosecutorial accountability, increase efficiency and professionalism, improve anti-corruption efforts, and access to justice. However, the action plan for 2024 to 2026 is still overdue. Implementation and monitoring of strategic documents need to be improved. 

According to the Annual Report on the implementation of the strategy of rule of law, excluding the activities completed in 2022, only 41 % of the 2023 activities were fully implemented, 34% were partially implemented or ongoing, and 24% had not started. Overall, across all years, 55% of activities have been completed, 26% partially completed, and 19% remain unimplemented. The report highlights key risks such as lack of prioritization and insufficient inter-institutional cooperation.   

Strategic plans have been introduced in certain areas of the justice system: The Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) has adopted the IT Strategic Plan for 2024-2029 for the implementation of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) digital justice tools. Similarly, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) has adopted the Communication Strategy for 2024-2027. However, these documents lack monitoring mechanisms, raising doubt about the genuine commitment to implementing meaningful change.  

Institutional disagreements  have also hindered the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Commitment which was intended to advance justice reforms through coordinated action.  Due to these disagreements, the Ministry of Justice proceeded with the implementation directly, despite the original plan for joint work with the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. These reforms were developed without sufficient consultation with relevant national and international stakeholders—most notably the Venice Commission. The absence of such consultations negatively affected both the quality of the legislation and its alignment with European standards. In particular, the Law on Performance Evaluation, Integrity Control, and the Status of Judges and Public Prosecutors remains unclear and does not fully comply with European requirements. 

The  delays in implementation have also been caused by political factors. Although the government holds a parliamentary majority, decision-making has been hampered  due to a lack of cooperation within the majority and with the opposition parties, especially regarding progress on  EU-related reforms. The situation was further complicated when members of the Serb minority party “Srpska Lista” boycotted the work of the Assembly. Serbia does not recognise Kosovo as a sovereign state and until today, ongoing ethnic tensions continue to pose challenges. Additionally, the centralisation of executive decision-making and insufficient inter-ministerial coordination have further undermined reform implementation. 

The KPC has accused the parliament of a destructive approach and obstructive tendencies, particularly concerning the adoption of the new law on the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council passed in mid-2024. They also alleged that the government disregarded numerous proposals from the European Union and local and international organisations. According to the KPC, this practice of unilateral adoption of legal acts demonstrates a deliberate effort by the government and the parliamentary majority to,  under the guise of reform, undermine and paralyse the law enforcement system.  

The inefficient and slow justice system in Kosovo poses a serious problem for the rule of law, as they erode public confidence in legal certainty and equal treatment before the law. Despite some progress (as outlined below), the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office continue to struggle with processing cases in a timely and effective manner.  

The delays are particularly pronounced in high-level corruption cases where proceedings are frequently prolonged by unnecessary adjournments of hearings and inefficient case management. Such procedural inefficiencies impose a heavy burden on the judicial system as a whole, undermining its credibility and diminishing public trust in its ability to deliver justice. Furthermore, the reopening of cases, even though mechanisms have been established to limit this practice, continues to contribute to the growing backlog of cases and to the extension of pre-trial detention periods, further eroding confidence in the judiciary’s effectiveness and fairness. . 

Another major factor impeding judicial efficiency is the inadequate penalisation of unjustified absences by parties from court hearings, as well as the underutilisation of tools to enforce procedural deadlines. 

On the legislative front, the adoption of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure represents an essential step towards  improving the efficiency of civil justice. Equally important is the new Law on Administrative Disputes, which constitutes a positive development aimed at strengthening the framework for administrative justice and increasing the accountability of public institutions. However, the pending Law on the Administrative Court must be adopted without further delay and should be subject to review by the Venice Commission to ensure compliance with European standards. Its prompt enactment and proper implementation are crucial to addressing the case backlog and restoring public confidence in the administration of justice. 

The problem of slow proceedings is compounded by the shortages in personnel, limited professionalism and insufficient expertise. In November 2022, Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors in northern Kosovo mass-resigned from their posts. This was part of a broader political crisis triggered by the government’s decision that vehicles with Serbian-issued licence plates must be re-registered with Kosovo authorities and receive Kosovo licence plates. In response, the Serb minority party in Kosovo (Srpska Lista) called on Kosovo Serbs employed in public institutions in northern Kosovo to resign which they did.  

Despite the reassignment of cases, mass resignations caused significant delays in judicial proceedings. According to a report by the OSCE mission this development reduced the capacity of courts and the prosecution offices to deliver justice, undermining the right to trial within a reasonable time and restricting access to justice. The sudden and substantial staffing shortages led to a noticeable decline in court and prosecutorial efficiency: at the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Basic Court completion rates fell from 75% to 59%, while the Basic Prosecutor’s Office saw a drop from 75 % to 57 %. 

The processing of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo War (February 1998 until June 1999) continues to pose a significant challenge. Numerous perpetrators from all sides, including Serbian leaders, such as Slobodan Milošević and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army  were brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In addition, several domestic trials have been held in both Serbian and Kosovo courts. However, limited resources and a lack of legal cooperation with Serbia continue to hamper the effective prosecution of war crimes. The absence of an adopted War Crimes Strategy and the ongoing backlog faced by  the War Crimes Unit further exacerbate these challenges. 

According to a 2024 report by the European Commission, government officials frequently criticise individual judgments or specific judges or prosecutors, despite constitutional guarantees for the independence of the judiciary. Such political interference, combined with inadequate anti-corruption mechanisms, continues to impede efforts to combat corruption at the highest level.  This observations repeated in the 2025 report where it is reiterated that the undue influence persists, stemming from both internal and external sources. Tense dynamics between the government and the judiciary, especially the prosecution, continued and intensified during the electoral campaign, highlighting the need to avoid political interference to ensure judicial independence. 

Critically, Kosovo lacks a strategic framework for addressing corruption. Although there is political will to establish the necessary legal infrastructure, the country  does not currently have a systematic approach to fighting corruption, primarily because no state anti-corruption strategy has been in place since 2019. The national anti-corruption strategy and action plan for 2024-2027 are still pending adoption. 

Important reforms, including the judicial review process and the reform of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, have yet to be implemented. A civil society report on the implementation of Chapter II (Prevention) & Chapter V (Asset Recovery) of the United Nations Convention against corruption in Kosovo notes that recent efforts to reforms of the judiciary and other law enforcement bodies have not complied with constitutional requirements. As a result, the Constitutional Court has declared enacted laws unconstitutional. 

Progress is further hampered by limited resources and capacity, as well as a lack of impartiality and accountability within the prosecution and judiciary. A stronger commitment to a solid track record in fighting corruption at the highest level is essential, including through the enhanced use of anti-corruption instruments such as asset declarations and integrity plans for public institutions.    

The Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) continue to operate with incomplete membership. The crucial managerial position of Chief State Prosecutor (KPC) has been vacant since April 2022, filled by an acting prosecutor. Recruitment processes for Chief Prosecutors appointed to most offices did not always meet merit-based standards