Albania
Basic Facts about the Country
Membership of the Council of Europe
13 July 1995
Entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights
2 October 1996
Basic Facts about the Judiciary
Budget per inhabitant
€ 15.76
(2023)
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ)
Overall number of judges
Number of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants
11.38
Tiers in the ordinary court system
3
First Instance Courts
16 (general jurisdiction and specialised courts)
Courts of Appeal
1
Supreme Court
1
Constitutional Court (State level)
Yes
- Composed of nine members, three appointed by the President of the Republic, three elected by the Assembly and three members by the Supreme Court.
- Term of office is nine years, without the right to be reappointed.
- The President of the Constitutional Court is elected by secret ballot, by a majority vote of all judges of the Constitutional Court, for a period of three-year, with the right to only one re-election.
The Constitutional Court decides on:
- compatibility of laws and normative acts with the constitution or with international agreements
- compatibility of international agreements with the constitution before they are ratified
- conflicts of competencies between powers and between central and local government
- constitutionality of political parties and political organisations and their activity
- dismissal from duty of the President and verification of his inability to exercise his functions
- issues related to the electability and incompatibility in exercising the functions of the President, members of parliament and other constitutional organs and verification of their election
- constitutionality of the referendum and verification of its results
- final examination of complaints of individuals against acts of the public power or judicial acts impairing fundamental rights and freedoms
If the Constitutional Court is asked to control the constitutionality of a law approved by the assembly on the revision of the constitution, it controls only the compliance with procedural requirements.
Public Prosecutors
There are different prosecution offices:
- general prosecution office (competent for representing the prosecution in the High Court and the Constitutional Court)
- special prosecution office (responsible for high-level corruption and organised crime cases)
- prosecution offices at courts of appeal of general jurisdiction
- prosecution offices at the courts of first instance of general jurisdiction
Judicial Governance
Type of governance system
High Judicial Council
- 11 members
- 6 judge members elected by the judges of all instances
- 5 members elected by the Parliament on the basis of the list established by a parliamentary sub-committee among jurists who are non-judges (two lay members elected from advocates, two from the corps of law professors and the School of Magistrates and one from civil society)
- 5-year mandate, no right of immediate re-election
High Justice Inspector
Elected upon three fifth majority of all members of the Assembly, for nine years, without the right to re-election, among highly qualified jurists with no less than 15 years of professional experience, of high moral and professional integrity. He or she may not have held a political post in the public administration or a leadership position in a political party in the last past 10 years before becoming candidate
Justice Appointments Council
Nine members selected by lot from the ranks of judges and prosecutors who are not under disciplinary measures, who serve a one-year term beginning on January 1 each year. Between December 1 and December 5 of each year, the President selects by lot two judges of the Constitutional Court, one judge of the High Court, one prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General, two judges and two prosecutors from the Courts of Appeal and one judge from the Administrative Courts. If the President does not make this selection by December 5, the Chairperson of the Assembly makes the selection by lot before December 10 of the year. The Ombudsperson serves as an observer of the selection by lot of the Justice Appointment Council, as well as its meetings and operations
Specialized Qualification Chamber (Appeal Chamber to the Independent Qualification Commission)
- 7 members
- Members of the Appeal Chamber and the Commission have law degrees from university, at least 15 years of work experience in the legal field, may not have worked as judges, prosecutors, legal advisors or legal assistants in the two years before nomination, may not have held a political post in the public administration or a leadership position in a political party in the 10 years before nomination
- Independent Qualification Commission has ceased its work in December 2024, it was made up of four panels with three members each
- Supported by an International Monitoring Operation led by the European Commission
Court Presidents
- Presidents of the first instance courts and courts of appeal are elected by the High Council of Justice. The President is elected among judges who are members of the respective courts.
- Near the end of the term of the President of the court, the High Council of Justice announces the vacancy for the court president. Court judges who meet the criteria and are interested, send a request to the High Council of Justice. High Council of Justice then decides winning candidate between applications. The elected President has to be decreed by the President of the Republic.
- The term of office of the Court president is 4 years.
Distribution of Responsibility
Overall aim: to ensure the independence, accountability and appropriate functionality of the judicial power in Albania
Its tasks include inter alia:
- Appointing, evaluating, promoting and transferring judges of all levels;
- Deciding on disciplinary measures on judges of all levels;
- Proposing to the President candidates for judges of the High Court;
- Approving the rules of judicial ethics and monitoring of their observation;
- Directing and managing the administration of the courts with the exception of the management of the information technology structure of the courts, which is regulated upon decision of the Council of Ministers;
- Proposing and administering its own budget and the budget of the courts;
- Informing the public and the Assembly on the state of the judicial system.
- Verification of complaints against judges and prosecutors of all levels, members of the High Judicial Council, High Prosecutorial Council and Prosecutor General and investigation, on its own initiative, of the disciplinary misconduct and initiation of disciplinary procedure against them, in accordance with the law
- Inspecting the courts and prosecution offices
- Verifying the fulfilment of legal requirements and assessment of professional and moral criteria of the candidates for the High Justice Inspector, as well as for the members of the Constitutional Court
- Examination and ranking of the candidates according to their professional merits (ranking is not binding except when the Assembly fails to make an appointment)
- Re-evaluation process of all sitting judges and prosecutors done by the Independent Qualification Commission (vetting process to tackle corruption in the judiciary)
- Appeal Chamber hears appeals against the Commission’s decision
- Mandate will end in June 2026
- Representing the court in relations with third parties;
- Adopting, at the beginning of year, a list that is updated whenever needed, assigning judges for trials in urgent cases
- Maintaining contacts with the control groups of other state institutions, becoming acquainted with the purpose and object of the control and creating possibilities for them to perform the duty;
- Overseeing that judicial ethics and solemnity are observed, as well as co-operating with the High Judicial Council in regard to the ethical and professional evaluation of judges;
- Overseeing the judges’ work discipline and requesting the initiation of investigations into an alleged disciplinary misconduct of the judges at their courts;
- Ensuring the organisation and the functioning of judicial administration in the court in regard to non-judicial activities via the chancellor;
- Convening, preparing and chairing the meetings of the general meeting of judges and the Court Council;
- Guiding and supervising the chancellor;
- Verifying complaints, investigating disciplinary misconducts and proposing the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the chancellor;
- Taking actions and decisions in relation to the status of judicial civil servants;
- Ensuring the implementation of decisions of the High Judicial Council, in particular in regard to the measures aiming at enhancing the efficiency and quality of judicial services;
- Ensuring access and the manner of using the case management system in compliance with the general state policies in the field of technology and security of information and rules adopted by the High Judicial Council in accordance with provisions of the Law ”On Governance Institutions of the Justice System in the Republic of Albania”;
Challenges
The 2024 Report on Albania by the European Commission found significant shortcomings in the efficiency of the High Judicial Council and High Prosecutorial Council. The Councils’ task is to appoint, promote, transfer and evaluate magistrates. Neither Council operates efficiently which in turn impacts the judiciary’s efficiency and quality: For example, the High Prosecutorial Council only conducted one evaluation since the implementation of the 2016 judicial reforms. Cooperation between the High Judicial Council and other supervising bodies such as the High Prosecutorial Council, the Ministry of Justice and the High Justice Inspector is poor.
In its 2025 rule of law report on Albania, the Commission reiterated concern regarding challenges in conducting timely evaluations, appointments, promotions and transfers of magistrates and emphasised that the Councils lacked important operating rules on conflict of interest of their members, resulting in potential conflicts of interest not being addressed.
The High Judicial Council is made up of 11 members, 5 of whom are not judges. The appointment of the non-judges has been delayed and influenced by Parliament. Non-judge members do not have to pass the same rigid background checks and asset declarations as judge-members which facilitates political influence on their appointment: Parliament’s influence impacted the quality of the background checks and assets verification of the candidates. It has been difficult to reach the required majority for appointment and Parliament has not paid sufficient regard to the candidates’ qualifications. As the High Judicial Council is responsible for appointing, transferring and promoting judges, political influence on the selection of candidates for the Council is concerning. What adds to this problem is that the High Judicial Council does not have internal rules of procedure about conflicts of interest.
A 2024 rule of law report by the EU found that the appointment process of non-judge members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council lacked transparency and meritocracy. Current legal provisions neither guarantee that the non-judge members are of the highest level of independence nor that they are highly skilled. The EU has recommended that the same standards of background checks and asset declarations should apply to non-judge members as to judge members. These concerns were reiterated in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law.
The EU Commission 2024 report on Albania stated that there were two serious incidents concerning judges who had to be placed under protection, although no further details are given, possibly due to the sensitivity of judicial security. Political attacks including inappropriate language and threats have targeted judges and there are reports about political pressure and intimidation such as accusations against judges. For example, in early 2025, Prime Minister Edi Rama made comments regarding judges at the Special Court Against Corruption in which he accused them of breaking the law by sharing secret files with the opposition. These comments were condemned by the High Judicial Council as targeting the integrity of judges. Some judges and their families had to be placed under protection because of threats to their safety.
The European Commission’s 2025 rule of law report indicated that while judicial resilience has improved, attempts of public officials or politicians to exert pressure on judicial system continue to raise concerns. It was also pointed out that the Special Prosecutor’s Office launched one criminal investigation concerning attempted pressure against a magistrate in a case concerning a member of Parliament.
Political influence and corruption diminish trust in the judiciary. It is also a hindrance to the prospect of EU accession as adherence to the rule of law is a requirement for accession.
Some Constitutional Court decisions, for example a decision on diaspora vote, were not implemented or their implementation was delayed by Parliament which undermines the court’s authority and creates uncertainty.
The Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) is primarily responsible for the fight against corruption. It investigates high profile corruption and organized crime cases. A Special Court Against Corruption and Organized Crime (GJKKO) has been established to adjudicate the cases brought by the special anti-corruption prosecutors. The anti-corruption fight has generally been regarded as a success. Noteworthy cases include the conviction of the former attorney general Llalla and the former minister of interior Tahiri and the investigation of former Prime Minister Berisha and former President Meta.
However, SPAK’s work has been hampered by an amnesty law in April 2024. The law granted amnesty to around 700 convicts and reduced the sentence of more than 400 other convicts. 40 prisoners convicted following a SPAK investigation were granted a full amnesty, another 65 received sentence reductions. The cases of 12 further persons investigated by SPAK were dismissed. The amnesty legislation is problematic because it is an obvious political interference in judicial proceedings and undermines the work of SPAK and the special courts. Corruption is a main hindrance to EU accession, and the EU Commission has called on Albania to refrain from actions that obstruct SPAK’s work.
In its 2025 Report, the Commission expressed concern about the shortage of financial and human resources, negatively affecting the quality of justice.
The length of judicial proceedings has increased and there is a high backlog of cases though this depends on the court. The highest backlog is recorded at the Court of Appeal and the Administrative Appeal Court: The average disposition time for civil and commercial cases in second instance was 2,272 days in 2022 and 8,680 days for second instance administrative cases.
These delays are caused by a lack of judges: To tackle corruption in the judiciary, a re-evaluation process of all sitting judges and prosecutors was implemented in 2016. Only 47% of those evaluated passed the process in the first instance. Judges and prosecutors who did not pass the evaluation were removed from their position while many also resigned voluntarily. In 2023, only 60.5% of the created vacancies were filled so that courts are understaffed and have difficulties to adequately deal with their case load. The High Judicial Council’s inefficiency hinders the appointment of skilled judges leading to transfers being frequently used as alternatives to promotions. The number of vacancies also results in cases not always being allocated randomly. Recently, the High Judicial Council has made some progress though and aims to fill the vacancies at the most understaffed courts by 2027/ 2028.
Also in the first instance courts, the backlog has increased in recent years. The average disposition time in first instance civil and commercial cases was 172 days in 2018 with a 98% clearance rate. In 2022, the average time was 377 days with a 89% clearance rate. In first instance administrative cases, the average disposition time increased from 90 days in 2018 to 179 in 2022 with clearance rates of 99% (2018) and 93% (2022). However, improvements could be seen comparing the backlog in 2020 and 2022 for first instance criminal decisions: In 2020, the average disposition time was 294 days (clearance rate: 74%) compared to 93 days in 2022 (clearance rate: 94%).
The problem of slow proceedings is addressed by the SEJ IV Project (Strengthening the Quality and Efficiency of Justice in Albania) led by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). The project is set to last from January 2023 until December 2026 and inter alia includes the implementation of cyberjustice tools to improve court management and training projects to reduce backlog.
Positive Developments & Achievements
Albania has tackled corruption issues in its judiciary by introducing a set of constitutional reforms in 2016. The most important reform was the introduction of a vetting process. All serving judges and prosecutors had to undergo a re-evaluation process which aimed at removing corrupt and unskilled officials from their judicial roles. They were evaluated according to three criteria: assets assessment, background assessment and an assessment of professional competence. An independent commission (Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime, SPAK) was responsible for the process. It was supervised by the International Monitoring Operation, an international body led by the EU Commission. The process is overall considered as a success and the first instance decisions about the removal of judges and prosecutors were completed in 2024.
The work of SPAK has led to investigations and convictions in high-profile corruption cases such as the conviction of the former attorney general Llalla and the former minister of interior Tahiri and the investigation of former Prime Minister Berisha and former President Meta. Cases investigated by SPAK also include those where the protection of EU financial interests was at stake.
Rankings and Surveys
Expert Recommendations
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain largely valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
- further strengthen accountability by: (i) finalising the vetting process; (ii) enhancing asset and background assessment standards, ensuring high-quality and speeding-up evaluation reports for all magistrates; (iii) aligning rules applicable to all non-magistrates of the HJC and HPC with those applicable to magistrates, as regards asset declaration and background checks; (iv) filling the magistrate-inspector vacancies at the High Justice Inspectorate, and (v) reducing political interference on the judiciary and prosecution services;
- improve the quality of justice by: (i) filling vacancies for court chairs, magistrates, legal advisers and court staff at all levels of the judiciary and increasing the total number of magistrates and legal advisers at all levels, towards the EU average; (ii) comprehensively revising the School of Magistrates’ entrance exam and initial and continuous training curricula; and (iii) increasing the quality and integrity of the School of Magistrates’ staff;
- improve judicial efficiency by: (i) adopting comprehensive legal and regulatory measures to increase efficiency at all levels, and to further reduce backlog, in line with the Roadmap for Judicial Efficiency, the principles of justice reform and European standards; (ii) finalising the procurement for and first piloting of the integrated case management system modules and (iii) expanding the online notification system for access to court files and processes to all courts of general jurisdiction.
2025 Enlargement Package - Albania Report
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and remain mostly valid. In the coming year, Albania should in particular:
- further strengthen accountability by: (i) speeding up vetting procedures in appeal; (ii) speeding up evaluations of magistrates and implementing conflict-of-interest regulations by the HJC and the HPC; (iii) aligning provisions applicable to the selection of non-magistrate members of HJC and HPC with those applicable to magistrates as regards asset declaration and background checks, ensuring the highest integrity and merit principles, and a high degree of consistency with the ranking of the ad-hoc pre-selection committee (iv) filling the magistrate-inspector vacancies at the High Justice Inspectorate;
- improve the quality of justice by making progress in filling vacancies for court chairs, magistrates and legal advisers at all levels of the judiciary and quality improvements at the School of Magistrates, in line with European standards, including the comprehensively revising the School of Magistrates’ entrance exam, increasing the relevance of training and ensuring quality and integrity of its staff;
- improve judicial efficiency by: (i) ensuring the necessary budget for the Integrated Case Management System and rolling it out in a timely manner; and (ii) enacting the HJC roadmap to increase efficiency and reduce the backlog in the judicial system.
Adopted by GRECO at its 85th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 21-25 September 2020)
28. GRECO recommended i) the selection and appointment of the High Court justices be made transparent and that the opinion of the judiciary (e.g. the High Council of Justice itself) be sought in those processes; and ii) the periodic evaluation of professional and ethical performance of a judge is conducted in a timely manner and that consideration be given to ensuring that the criteria for evaluating a judge’s ethical conduct are objective and transparent, with due regard to the principle of judicial independence. [partly implemented]
CHAPTER 23 – JUDICIARY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
I. JUDICIARY
I.A GENERAL OVERVIEW
b. Commission assessment
Albania is moderately prepared on the functioning of the judiciary. Albania’s legislative and institutional framework on judiciary has a high level of alignment with the EU acquis and European standards. The 2016 judicial reform led to profound reform of the legal and institutional framework of the judiciary and prosecution services and put in place legal guarantees to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and prosecution, including: unblocking mechanisms for the appointment of judges and prosecutors; tools to avoid political influence in justice institutions, accountability mechanisms, and the vetting of all sitting judges and prosecutors. The judicial reform led to a full institutional restructuring of the judiciary and prosecution services in line with European standards, including the reform of the Constitutional Court and the establishment of new bodies for the self-governance of the judiciary. Continuous legal fitness checks and targeted legal changes are necessary to eliminate legal bottlenecks and consolidate the legal framework to further strengthen the independence and integrity of the judicial and prosecutorial systems, ensure efficient delivery of justice, consolidate the capacity of justice institutions, and increase public trust in the judiciary. Notably, provisions regulating pre-election of the non-magistrate members of the HJC and HPC should be aligned with the standards of background check and asset declaration applicable to magistrates. nonAny legal initiatives in the justice sector need to be compliant with EU acquis and European standards, and further strengthen the principles of the 2016 justice reform. Albania has maintained an overall steady implementation of the framework put in place by the 2016 justice reform. Albania needs to further consolidate and deepen the implementation of the reformed legal and institutional framework, notably by ensuring effective cooperation between justice institutions, allocation of sufficient resources and efficient systemic functioning of the justice sector. The capacity, independence and efficiency of the independent self-governance bodies of the judiciary needs to be strengthened, including by ensuring quality of their decisions, transparency of their work and effective public communication. The capacity of specialised bodies (SPO, NBI and the Courts for High Level Corruption and Organised Crime) need to be significantly strengthened to ensure that they conduct their work in an efficient manner. The renewal of the HJC and HPC membership should follow the principles of full transparency and independence. All non-magistrate members of the justice institutions, notably those appointed to the HJC and HPC, need to be subject to similar standards of background check and asset declaration applicable to magistrates.. The quality of HJC and HPC decisions, including compliance with European law and standards should be ensured. Further efforts are needed to achieve efficient delivery of justice and quality of judiciary and prosecution services. The acute problems of the backlog of cases, length of proceedings, as well as a lack of integrated case management, weak in-court performance, quality and streamlining of judicial acts, and limited public access need to be forcefully addressed. The vetting process, carried out under independent international monitoring, has delivered good results in increasing the accountability of the justice sector. Albania must ensure systematic initiation of criminal procedures against judges and prosecutors whose vetting process revealed criminal elements. The vetting institutions are expected to systematically refer cases to prosecution services where there are indications of criminal offences. Prosecution services are encouraged to proactively initiate criminal procedures against judges and prosecutors whose vetting process revealed criminal elements. The vetting process should be orderly finalised before the constitutional deadlines, and appeals accelerated, without prejudice to the quality of the judicial review. The implementation of the strategic framework is under way, however, strengthened capacities to collect and report data, and further improvement of coordination between the justice institutions remain necessary. Albania must ensure prompt execution of ECtHR judgements, notably on the right to enforcement of final judicial decisions and excessive length of judicial proceedings.
Compliance with European Courts' Judgements
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
State Performance
Number and % of rulings fully complied with
Number and % of rulings partly complied with
Number and % of rulings not complied with
Number and % of rulings where impossible to judge compliance
Number and % of rulings pending for 2 or more years
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
State Performance
Moderately poor
Implementation record
25
75 %
51
Judgements with pending implementation
Selected leading judgments pending implementation
Luli and Others v. Albania
These cases concerned the excessive duration of court proceedings between 1996 and 2021.
Court proceedings were heavily delayed because the proceedings were frequently referred between different bodies. For example, in one case, the proceedings before one level of jurisdiction took six years, in another they lasted more than 6 years before two levels of jurisdiction. In a case before the Supreme Court, the court remained inactive for more than two years and then dismissed the appeal. These delays were held to be a violation of Art. 6(1) (right to a fair trial) ECHR.
The ECtHR obliged Albania to pay damages to the applicants. Albania followed this obligation in all except for one case. Although improvements regarding the long duration of court proceedings were made, there remains a significant backlog of cases in second-instance courts. The high backlog is due to vacancies following an anti-corruption vetting process of judges.
64480/09, 64482/09, 12874/10, 56935/10, 3129/12 and 31355/09
01-07-2014
Brahimaj v Albani
The case concerned the failure of Albanian authorities to execute final judicial decisions awarding the applicant damages against the state.
In 2007, an Albanian court ordered the police to pay the applicant damages for the destruction of their property. The decision became final in 2008. From 2009 to 2012 attempts were made to enforce the decision, but the damages have not been paid.
The ECtHR held that the failure to enforce the judgment violated Art. 6(1) (right to a fair trial) and Art. 13 (right to an effective remedy) ECHR. Albania was ordered to pay the applicant the damages within three months after the ECtHR judgment. Albania followed this order. The state also introduced measures to address the issue of non-enforcement of judgments: Legislative and practical measures were taken including a general acceleratory and compensatory remedy. The success of these measures is still under evaluation.
4801/13
06-10-2016
Thanza v Albania
The case concerned the re-evaluation procedure of a Supreme Court judge who was removed from office.
The applicant had served as a Supreme Court judge since 2013. In 2016, constitutional reforms were introduced that included a vetting process of all sitting judges and prosecutors to tackle corruption. All judges and prosecutors were evaluated according to three criteria: assets assessment, background assessment and an assessment of professional competence. The applicant was evaluated in 2017. The High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) questioned the submissions he made about his assets and considered them to be inaccurate and not in accordance with the law. Thus, HIDAACI proposed to remove the applicant from his post. Following evaluation of all criteria by the Independent Qualification Commission (IQC), the applicant was dismissed from his office in 2018. The applicant appealed to the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC). The SAC reviewed his case after a written procedure without a public hearing and in the applicant’s absence. The IQC’s decision was upheld, and the applicant was removed from office.
Before the ECtHR the applicant argued that the vetting proceedings did not meet the criteria for a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law as required by Art. 6 ECHR. The ECtHR criticised the SAC’s reasoning and reliance on evidence calling the reasoning “excessively formalistic”. Given the consequences of disciplinary proceedings (e.g. dismissal), the Court found that parts of the vetting process had violated Art. 6(1) ECHR. The applicant also claimed that his dismissal from office and provisions impacting his ability to practice as a lawyer breached Art. 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life). However, the Court did not find such a breach.
The applicant was awarded damages. The Albanian government is of the opinion that no further individual and general measures are necessary. This view is currently under assessment.
41047/19
04-10-2023
Besnik Cani v Albania
The case concerned the dismissal of a public prosecutor following a re-evaluation by a vetting body which included a judge who was appointed in violation of a statutory eligibility criterion.
The applicant had been a prosecutor since 2003. In 2016, constitutional reforms were introduced that included a vetting process of all sitting judges and prosecutors to tackle corruption. All judges and prosecutors were evaluated according to three criteria: assets assessment, background assessment and an assessment of professional competence. The applicant was evaluated in 2018, and the Independent Qualification Commission (IQC) confirmed him in his office. However, the Public Commissioner’s Office appealed against the IQC’s decision, and the case was brought before the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC). One of the members of the SAC was a judge who had been appointed to this position in violation of statutory eligibility requirements. The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against this judge alleging forgery. He also requested that the judge be removed from his position at the SAC which was rejected by the SAC. Then the applicant requested that the judge be excluded from hearing his case, which was also rejected. He further lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court requesting that the judge’s appointment be declared unconstitutional. Despite his request that the proceedings before the SAC be halted until the Constitutional Court decided on his complaint, the SAC considered his case and by majority decision dismissed him from his position in 2020.
In its judgment, the ECtHR argued that the “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” (Art. 6(1) ECHR) required an adequate appointment process of judges and based on the facts of the case that the judge in question should not have been appointed to the SAC. Thus, the Court found a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR in the applicant’s case.
The ECtHR did not award damages but held that the proceedings should be re-opened if the applicant wished such a re-opening. The judgment’s implementation is under evaluation.
37474/20
04-01-2023
Further Readings
Acknowledgements
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Rule of Law Programme South East Europe
The data and analysis for this country were contributed by the experts of the Rule of Law Programme South East Europe of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung